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PREFACE
This thesis has been prepared in recognition of the increasing attention given to the installation ot incentives tor indirect labor.

In past years, the great bulk ot labor was that on

the production line, namely, direot labor.

output was low and

methods were slow, result1ng in relatively low indirect labor
requirements to provide service to the manufacturing group.
Now, with expanding indirect f'unll'tlons in relation to the
d1reot functions and a high degree of control of the dlrect
production areas, management is turning its attentlon to the
lndlrect groups, who hlthertofore, were controlled merely by
using whatever quantlties of people were required to get the job
done.
This thesls recognizes many of the ways that management is
now oontrolllng the required quant1ties of 1ndirect labor through
the use ot incentives.
Very special thanks are due those ind1viduals and companies
who provided detailed insight into their handling of incentives
for indirect labor.

Their request for anonimity will be honored

throughout this thesls.
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OHAPTER I
INTRODUOTION
The pUrPose of this paper 1s to tell what has been done and
is now

beln~

done in the field of indirect incentives, what types

of occupations ma.y be covered with incent1ves, and the yardsticks
used to measure production for the various occupat1ons constitut-in~ the ~oups called ind1rect labor. l Many articles have been
written and talks Jl:1ven. tel11ng
have been covered with incentives.

of various indirect groups that
For some of the categories to

be covered, the measurements and applications from one Jl:roup to
another are similar.

Similar incentives may be appl1ed 1n other

industries with little dev1at1on.
1ndirect labor

groUDS,

However, for other types of

the measurements used for incent1ves w1ll

be greatly varied from one ;(roup to the next.

Although several

d1fferent types of measurements w1ll be reflected in the chapters
to follow, they may reflect l1ttle more than sample possib1lities
to anyone intending to apply standards to an indirect labor greup,
ii

...

1 •. Indirect labor may be defined as those individuals or
groups who do not by their own physical efforts affect the quality
or form of the produet, but do perform work in connection with the
'Product. Oareful avoidance of the term "indirect incentives,:" bas·
been exercised.. An lndlrect incentive is one which measures the
worker with a factor over which he has virtually no control. In-cent1ves for ind1rect labor may be either indirect incentives or
direct incentives. Direct incentives are established on aea81s
of a givenquahtity of work that is recognized as assignable
directly to a group or individual.
1

2

since the nature ot organizations may. vary so greatly.
OOcu'Dations Included.
included is a

categor1zin~

The breakdown of the occU'oationa
wh1ch reflects 1ndustry in general.

No

lndustry wlll have all of the groups lncluded. and certalnly. the
measurements would not be applicable to s1mllar occupations in
other llcations.

Moat industries will have several of the occu-

patlons 'Dresented.
may

cate~orlze

Some lndustries having the same occupations,

them as direct labor, auch as a mail order houae,

where order flllers pick orders ready for shipment, this being the
bep;lnning and end pl'oduct, rather than a step of the productlon
process.

Although, this type of activity is considered as a bus-

iness, rather than an

1ndust.ry~

many of the occupat1ons which

occur in it, would appear in 1ndustries.
Off1ce bus1nessea, such as insurance companies or banks
'Oresent another type of labor wh1ch tldo not by their own effort·s
affect the Quality or form ott a 'Dl'oduct.

These p;%"C\)ups 1tl factor-

ies would perf'o.rm cler1cal or non-superv1sory staff funct10ns and
w1ll represent the f1rst group to be 1ncludedin this paper •.
S1nce the product generally handled by th1s

~up

1s paperwork,

the method of estab11sh1ng ind1rect 1ncent1ves will 1n many
s1tuat1ons be app11cable to the strictly 'Oaperwork
enterprises.

~enerat1ng

Th1s category w1l1 1nclude such graups as Indust.r1al

Eng1neer1ng. Industr1al Relat10ns people, Account1ng people,
Eng1neers, Draftsmen, Productlon Control people, Secretarles,
Typlsts"and Clerks.

Their superv1sors will also be

lncluded.~

Great care has been taken ln g1 v111g examples ef the occupatlons

>

3
1n this group to 1nclude only "front off1ce" type occupat1ons.
Cler1cal funct1ons, such as T1mekeepers, Mi.ll Clerks and Recorders
of va.rious types

w1~1

be considered 1n a more appropr1ate cate-

gory of !tiM1reet jobs 1n the

faotory~

FUrther analyaea and break!

downs of these groups, and even sub-oatagorles, where d1fferences
w111 affect the measurements
1n~

w1th these general
The

tollow1n~

w11~

be expressed 1n Chapter"<II deal-

cate~or1es.

chapter w111 deal with ind1rect jobs 1n the

tactory, ~ namely those jobs in the 'Drev1ous paragraph when performed 1n d1reot conjunct1on with the faotory and at the s1te 01'
manufacture.

Also inoluded 1n this chapter w111 be those tactory
"unmeasurable10bs:2 so oalled, beoause of the ~eneral unrepet1-

t1veness of the work. one suoh group 1s ma1ntenance, others are
paok1ng, sh1pp1ng, reoe1v1ng, 1nspect1on, test1ng and troubleshoot1ng, and speo1al construot10n crews.

Ms..terial handlers, set-

up men, stock room people and others may be less repet1t1ve baaed
on the degree of 1nd1v1dua11ty of the produot as may ooour 1n a
job shop operat1on.
The last group to be d1scussed 1s that of management, namely,
the measurement of the superv1sors 01' all of the aforement1oned
categories 1n add1t10n to the company's execut1ves and Foremen 01'
the d1rect labor crewa.
Advantages

!!

Incent1ves

!2!

Indireot Labor.

Some 01' the

2. V1rg1l Rotroft, "Now Those Unmeasurable Jobs are Meas-urable~ Faotory, axvII (February, 1959)~ 192-193 •.

4
advantages ot incentives tor indirect labor become increas1ngly
apparent from read1ng a l1st wb.1ch one company's Industrial
Eng1neer1ng Department recently included 1n a carefully formulated
program to sell management on the v1rtues of installing an incenti ve in a 'P.rticular area.

This area was the first area in

indirect 1ncent1ves 1n that particular companv:\., ill that the only
other type. of measurements previously used were nf the indirect
type.
Advantage.,!. !l! Indirect':, Wage Incentives
l~.

2.

To ach1eve maximum interest in individual workers,
in order to seCllnl contz'ibut1ons to better department use of labor. work area and material, and
thereby improve the d1v1sion's cost performance.
To provide a more scientific approach 1n control-~
indirect labor costs than the mere acceptance
of a "favorable trend:

lin~

3.
4.

Such a "yardstick" will rel1eve upper mana~ement
of the burden of closely scrutinizing the amount
ot labor in these ~u'ps.
It will provide appreciable savings by maintain-the hours of indirect work at a minimum.

i~

5.

Area management w1l1 be relieved of the burden of
expla1ning "too many peo'Dle" or plead1ng for addi-tional people believed to be required 1n the div1-sion.

6.

They provide an impetus to management to reduce lagtime in reducing indirect labor in prO'Der relationship to direct labor.

7.

To enable maximum product1ve 'Performance ot the
d1rect operations.

At th1s t1me, th1s particular 1ndirect labor problem
w11l cease to exist as a problem. The sole judgement
easily made of ut1lizat1on ot these ind1rect labor

5
groUPS w111 be "area management 1s do1ng 1ts job" or
1s not do1ng 1ts job~3

The advantages listed, present many obv1ous 1mp11cat1ons.

In

the f1rst advantage 11sted, of ach1ev1ng "max1mum 1nterest 1n
1nd1v1dual workers: the bas1c self
humans posess 1s reflected.

preser~at1on

that most rat10nal

It s1mpry po1nts out that the employ-

ees w1ll rece1ve added ccmnensat10n for added work and Will be
recognized for both poor and acceptable quant1ties of work.

The

standard, in whatever form 1t exists" although 1t may in many
c~ses

not be po1nted toward anyone 1ndiv1dual, w111 1nd1cate the

company's expectat10ns by

reco~iz1ng

the hundred ner cent pertor-

mance mark.
Item two refers to the fact that a pre-formulated method of
calculati~

standard performance, is far better than the company's

execut1ves being sat1sf1ed w1th a lower ratio of indirect to
direct labor than has existed previously or maklng abstract
judgements that quantities of ind1rect labor may seem too great.
The th1rd statement 1ndicates the difficult1es 1mpl1ed 1n
the second statement, that upper management has to guess and judge
on the bas1s of lim1ted facts, what quant1t1es of ind1rect labor
are required.

In th1s statement 1s

1ndicated that management

may look merely at a performance, with perhaps a few s1mple
implications, to determine that ind1rect labor in a given area 1s.
or 1s not dOing 1ts job.

This would be far s1mpler than the

3. The company whose document was the source of this quote
wished to rema1n anonymous.

6

intensive inquisitions requi1"ed wlthout suoh mea.sures.
The fifth item is an answer; to the third whereby lower
management does not have to satisfy the whims of upper management
in its allowable and acceptable quantities ot personnel.

Area

supervision with the aid of incentives tor its indireot people
may judge objectively it the people in the area are not working
hard enough, or perbaDs. if additional personnel are needed.
When the standard indicates that considerably more people would
be warranted by the number of standard hours, bonus or other
measure used. the supervisor may Simply increase his toroe.

This

is possible, of course, assuming that poor performanoe by the
ob.1ective measure does not come as a result of the force increase.
The sixth advantage reflects deeply seated implications.
Previously, before/the installation of indirect incentives, in the
area included in the report, management could not tell what effect
the increase or decrease of labor had on the 1mmed1ate future ot
the area.

As a result of the indirect incentive and caretul

study by the Industrial Engineers, the reqUirements, as a result

ot the affect of changes in the related direct labor force were
made evident.

Thus, indirect supervisors could follow the formula

objectively instead of waiting to see what would happen.
The maintaining of "indirect work hours at a minimum" is self
evident in its purpose as the basic reason for any type ot incentive installation--to use less man hours to do the job.
The last item "to enable maximum productive performanoe of the
direct o'Oeration" suits the definition previously given of work

performed "1n conjunct1on w1th the

product~

In the paper quoted

tor discusslon are lncluded materlal handllng and set-up occupatlons.• whlch by thelr nature are those which keep the 11nes
rolllng.

If these occupat.iona are not provldlng the material to

be worked on andaLso clearing the assembly llne for contlnued
production" the direct crews performance would surely suffer.
Even more lndlrectly, the same may be said for amlntenance men,
who keep the machlnes runnlng and the factory ln good mechan1cal
conditlon. Industr1al Eng1neers, who provlde the best working
methods, the janitors, who prov1de the surround1ngs for a better
worklng atmosphere, etc.
In another report, many of the ldeas of the above are relterated as reasons why there should be 1ncentlves:
As an a1d ln meetlng our hlgh performance stand-ards, we have stressed the systematl0 use of faots to
sharpen managerlal and supervlsor'Y judgement. As a
speolfl0 example, we have ooncent.rated on the use of
tlmestudy and other forms of work measurement to lmprove performanoe through lnoreaslng effic1enoy.
Our work ln thls f1eld ls almed at providlng
management and supervls10n wlth performance yardstloks and other alds whloh they oan use to lmprove
thelr operatlons. Partly as a result of our efforts
ln thls area, we have atta1ned a favorable oompetltlve posltlon ln the 1ndustry whlle at the same tlme
provid1ng thousands of jobs at good wages and out-stand1ng fringe beneflts for our people.
Now however, the profits of our Company and the
jobs of our people are belng threatened by everlncreaslng oompetltlon • • • 4

4. The Management Consultant flrm whose work on a SUpe£vlsory Ilanual ls shown here w1shes to remaln anonymous.

I

!

In still another manual for a different group by the same
consult-ant firm it 1s stat.ed that the indirect incentive. were£
flUi tiated primarily to supply departments wi tb. a meaBS 01' evaluating performance from the standpoint of utilization 01' manpower
and accompli sb.ment of work assignments.

The pJ"ogram will also

assist in the control of cleri,cal costs, the determination of
personnel requirements and in other related areas: 5
Still another report states that

thelr~anager's

purpose 1s

to plan clerical costs more adequa.tely and to compel. perfonnance
to contorm to plan more precisely:6 This item reflects similar
think1ng to thate iD1J>l'1ed in items two, four, and. tive of the first
set of advantages listed.
The toregoing advantages are aimed at the l'ower echelon
people,.

In another analysis aimed at management incentives, added

advantages as well as overlapping can eas11y be seen.
An effective aUEervlao,rf incentive Pl!O~ram controls
iiiiniitacturlns costs--eu s them and hoI s them down and
- at an expense, thit"s 1,8S,S than the savings.

It ¥rov1dea & Earellel means 01' maintaining a EroEer
!It erentlal-between the earnIngs of supervisors and sup_·
ervlaed.. That appl'les especially where there is an'
incentive tor the workers.
A supervisory incentive htlPS draw the lower echelon
it supervision closer to he core-o?:management. It
SIves them some financIil-staKe:rn-Succesifui operations •.

-

5. Ibid., Procedure Manual •.
6. Billy E •. Goetz,~ "Planning and Controllins Routine Cler1cal
Costs~ Advanced Management,
XXIII (October 1958), 23.

9

It Irov1dee ~ means of comparing performances !! ~
arv dual superv1sors for development and promot1on
programs.

l! helps 1ntegrate !h! contr1bution 1! operat1ons 2l
serv1ce and s;aff departments·tIf they are 1ncluded
in the plan).

Another period1cal art1c1e 1n the same aer1es as that above,
suggest the same advantages as the f1rst four just ment1oned, plus
the added advantages:
It's as much of an 1ncant1ve during periods ot slack
iiiCrl'ow ProCiu'Ctl'iii as when th1ngs are humm1ng. ThSOt ' a
IiiiPorEint~~ we th1tlk-;-because we are Just as anx10us
(1t not more so) to 1nsp1re efflc1ency when we're
staring a loss 1n to face as we are dur1ng lush perlods. 8
The last serles ot advantages 1s h1ghllghted by answering the
quest1on, "Why do we have th1s plan?

Because management was oon-

v1nced that the l1ne supervlsors could cut and control cost • ..,..if'
stimulated by proper 1ncentlve: 9
Pr1mar1ly, per1od1cal l1.terature has been used 1n th1s study.
S1nce the field is fairly new, not texts have been wr1tten as yet.
Var10us compan1es have prov1ded the author with the1r processes
and formulae used in the development of their 1ncentive appliea-t1ons.

7. Robert S.Rioe,
CX! (July 1953), 97.
8.

"Incent1~es

for

Supervi80rs~

Factory,

-

J. E. Heldgen and Hiley Davis, "Incentives for Middle
Factory, OXI (July 1953), 98.

Management~

9. George E•. McCarthy and John J. P10car, "Control Costs
with SUperv1sor's Incent1ves~ Factory, OXI (July 1953), 103.

CHAPTER II
INCENTIVES FOR CLERICAL AND NON-SUPERVISORY STAFF GROUPS

Levela'IfiolUded.

Th1s chapter 1s conoerned w1th 1ncent1ves

tor clerical and non-superv1sory
th1s group 1s the

~rthest,

sta~f

groups. IU may be sa1d that

most 1n d1rect group 1n relat10n to

the d1rect product1on.. Ind1rect labor 1n the

~actory

works

adjacent to and 1n d1rect connect1on w1th the d1rect factory people.

The management group 1s composed

ers' superv1sors and the1r assoc1a.tes.

o~

the d1rect labor work-

The cler1cal group, as

1ncluded here cons1sts ot the non-superv1sory, tront-ott1ce
workers.

Table I, toll.owing,coyers the 1ncent1ve 1n.tallat1ons to

be d1scussed 1n the ahapter.
TABLE I
INCENTIVE PLANS DISCUSSED IN THIS CHAPTER

Plan No.

OCcupat1ons Covered (Company)

Page References

1.

Miscellaneous Cler1cal (P1tney Bowea)

11,.13, 15, 18
19, 21, 25.

2. "

All Otf1ce and Cler1cal (Anonymous
Consultant Developed Plan)

16, 25.

3.

SUperv1sors, Lower Management and
Cler1cal(Amer1can Seat1ng)

12, 14, 18, 24,
26, 29, 75, 79,
88.

4.

Cler1cal

Operat1on.(r~cro

10

Sw1tch)

15, 16.

11
Slnce this group conslsts ln large part of women offlce workers, the motlvatlon to perform at a hlgher than average rate ls
by and large less than that of the factory or management groups.
Thls ls true because the women workers aue neltber supportlng famll1es, as a general rule, or seeklng to advance ln the business
world as are the factory workers and members of management
respectlvely.
Gllbert Brooks, Chief Tlme Study Engtneer of the Pltney Bowes
Company recosn1zes the sensitlv1ty of women off1ce workers in bls
statement which follows:

"The technlcal problems of clerlcal work

measurement can be solved by any good lndust,rialenglneer trained
ln tbe fleld of sbop incentlve prlnclples, however, lt requlres an
exceptlonally good lndustrial englneer wl th plenty of tact, and
dlplomacy to take on the Job of condltlonlng the offlce employees
to tlme measurements~l
Tbe job of se1l1ng incentlves to workers ls tbe most dltt1cul1
1n thls area, net only because of the sensltivlty mentloned above,
of women otfloe workers, but because of professlonal prlde in tbe
male workers.

Also, the trad1tion of no t1me clock and the salary

basls of pay, welghs heavlly agalnst recelvlng a favorable welcome
ln the lnsta1latlon of offloe lncentlves.

Factory workers may

not reslst lncentlves, on an 1ndlvldual basls, besldes the fact
that lncentlves are more or less, tradlt10na1ly acceptable ln the

1. Gllbert Brooks, "Measur1ng Oftice Operatlons for Incentlve
Unpubllshed works from an address to the Elghth Annual Systems
Meetlng, Detrolt, Michlgan. (October 1955), 2.

--12

tactory.
Reoognizing the always wise approach of letting the people
know what you have 1n mind when changes are to be ma4e, .Mr. Brooks
and h1s Industrial Engineers carefully explained his objectives to
the first pilot group in his cler1cal inoent1ve installat10n
(~lan No.

l).

Th1s was done by ". • • hold1ng a series of meet-

ings with the supervisors and the employees.

At these meetings

we explained the funct10n at time study, showed how t1me stud1es
were taken, how we plotted our elemental time, values 1n order to
arr1ve at the standard t1mes and showed them samplet1me studies.
Atter these meet1ngs we made a point

sitting down with each
operator and again explain1ng our function, • • • .. 2
o~

..

The above approach was a direct one trom and company's Industrla1 Engineering group to their fellow employees 1n another:
depart.ment.

Another organiza'ttion handled the installa.tion of

clerical and off1ce incentives (Plan No.2) through the use of a
management consultant f1rm spec1alizing in this type 01' endeavor.
In this latter company, the management consultant team prepared
a lesson plan format to the1r.employees.

In this more impersonal

approach was included an explanat10n of the company's compet1tive
s1tuation and the 1ilcreas1ng needs 01' controlling and reducing
operat1ng costs.

Workers

wer~

told how the plan was to work and

how measurements were to be set up.

An appeal was made that both

the oompany and the employees would benef1t.

-

2. Ib1d., p. 4.

Selected pert1nent

--questions were asked and answered to stimulate further questions
that the groups may bave. 3
It was int-ere-sting to note in 'the Pitney Bowes Company's
installation (Plan No. J:;) that attercaretul indoctrination
in the pilot group, additional groups actually requested incentive coverage, a' a snowballing pace, until max1mum coverage waa
achieved.

People found that they could 1ncrease the1r earnings,

without a loss of dignity.

'l'his, of course, does not mean that

every employee chose to work harder to make more money.

Some

preferred to worltat a lesser pace for the-ir baserate. 4 Instances were tound where a spec1al need .arose, and such ind1viduals
I

would work to atta1n the incentive pace and then settle back to
the base rate.

AtteJUpts were made, of course, to place those

workers who wanted to be on 1ncentive in the covered areas, and
other workers in areas whioh were not go1ng to be oovered tor
some time, 1f at all. 5
The Pitney Bowes inoentive oovered just under th1rty per cent
of all ottice employees at the1r home ottice and factery, represent1ng a general cross sect10n of all their otti.ce functions to ..
include order and traft1c people, all typing work, :~;order-1'orm

~vw~

filing, duplicating, acoount1ng sections of various types, record
3.

Anonymous Procedures Manual.

4. Base rate. The pay expressed in dollars per time period
to which other-cons1derations 1n wages are added, sUQh as 1ncentiw
premium, overtime, sh1ft bonus. The hourly rate of pay on which
1ncentive earnings are based. Generally a guarantee.

-

Ibid. p. 9.
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sectlons~

The

advertlsing and tabul.atlng.
consultant~developed

lncentlve plan covers every worker

ln the organizatlon who ls not on a dlrect productlon status.

The

pecular1tles ot stud.y1ng the groups w11l be 1ncluded elsewhere 1n
th1s chapter under the sect10n on methods ot measurement and.
yardsticks ot product1on.
other groups included more speclflcally, ln add1tion to the
st.r1ctly clerlcal functlon are those of Indu8.trial Eng1neers,
Xethods Engineers, Plant

Englneers~

and the l1ke 1n tor

the American Seatlng Company of Grand Raplds,

M1chlgan~

example~

1ncent1ve

plan (Plan. No.3) •., This plan ls based on budget performance, and
\

1s pald to Superv1sors, loweri'management, and clerical people on
the bas1s ot thelr control over product14m and operat1ng costs.9

2!

Yardst1cks

-..pr
...o_d;; ;.;u; ; .;o;.,; t;.;:1;.; 0..
n.

One ot the most d1,ttlcult pl"Oblems

in establ1shing ind1rect 1ncent1ves 1s that ot 4eterm1nlng the
measureme.nt ot the crews eff'orts.

How many more un1ts of produc-

t10n are be1ng produced, than were produced prev1ously?
tactory, tor d1rect

labor~

th1s 1s easy.

In the

One merely counts the

pleoes that are produoed or exam1ne.s equlpment productlon. charts
or cycle counts.

The people delegated to wrlte lncentlvestor

1nd1rect occupatlons have the imaginatlon to select that tactor
whlch most closely reflects the ef'tort at the lncentlve lndlv1d-ual or group.

In this sect10n wlll be tound a variety at meas-

urements or yardstlcks, ranglng trom p1ece work measurements to

6.

Heldgen, p. 98.
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abatraet budget performanoe figures.

Although an intormal

analy~

must be made of several yardst1cks 1n the torm of taking various
measurements,.stud1es or looks at historical records, a yardstick
must f1nally be selected betore 1ntensive work can be begun in
the measurement of the crew for incentive standards.
The P1tney Bowes Company plan (Plan No.1) measures pert'ormance through the yardst1ck of number of copies made 1n the
reproduc1ng section, quant1 ty 0'1 letters typed 0'1 a given size
type, and other units of production which may be construed as
little more than p1ecework type 1ncentives paying the base rate
for performance under one hundred percent.

Ttils 1ncentl va is on

an 1ndividual basls in some departments and a groqp basis ln

oth~

the reason tor the variation being the nature 0'1 work in some
areas cauaing otherwise unmeasurable jobs or laok of differentiation where one worker begins and another lett oft.?

The Micro

Switch Company (Plan No.4) uses a s1i'n1lar p1ecework measure in
its clerical operations, developing flow charts to show the times

tor each phases
Methods

0'1

an operat1on.

!! Measurement !£ Developing Standards. Whatever

yardstlck ls selected to be the bas1s 0'1 establlsh1ng an incentlve,

some sort of standard must be applied to the actual pro-

ductlon to determlne it it is better than what is expected or
worse.

7.

The development of standards may take a multitude of torms

Brooks, p. 12.

1

baaed on thetype ot yardstick that is used.
The previously mentioned Micro Switch Oompany (Plan No.4)
chose the use of

Work~Factor

Predetermined Time Values as applied

to previously methodized operat1ons.

This 1nvo1ved a two step

approach:
1.
2.

To get standard working cond1t10ns.

Break down analyt1ca11y the cond1t1ons and standardize
them. 8

The use of tb.1s type of measure means an element by element
observance ot a task.

Ult1mate1y standard data can be \&Bd which

picks up broader categor1es encompass1ng many elements.

Th1s com-

pany as a Work-Factor user 1n 1ts direct operatlons bad the facll
11tles and trained personnel to pertorm the Work-Factor ana1ysea
requlred to set up the measurement by th1s method.
The management consultant (Plan No.2) 1ald out a plan
lncorporatlng several work study techn1ques, all dlfterent trom
the above" although "predetermined tlme values,: wh1ch are generally based on measurements of body movements wll1 be used to'
compare results obtalned under the above three methods~9 ,
1.

T1mestudy 1s the measurement ot the actual pertormance ot a task by a stepwatch. Dependlng on the
clrcumstances, tasks wl1l generally be broken down
lnto elements and stopwatch readings tor each
element wll1 be recorded.
The number of

c~c1es

stud1ed w1l1 depend on the com-

8. Robert L. Humphrey,. trSystem Standards ana System Analys1s ~ An unpublished address to the Work-Factor Assoc1ates of the
M1dwest, Chicago, Illlno1s (October 1959H
9.

Anonymous Procedures Manual.
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of the task. A coavenient rule of thumb
suggests taking studies of
cycles or one balf
hour, whichever is shorter. l

plexi~y

58

Insofar as pra.ctical, time obf!rvaticns will be made
by continuous read1ng methods
although sometimes
observat1ons, such as .measurementl~f 1solated elements w111 be made us1ng snapback
method.
2.

Work Sampling is a' techn1que for determining the
time spent in performdng various tasks by random
sampl1ng. Based on the law ot probab11ity,.a
sufficient number of samples ot an activ1ty will
provide the rat10s to the total time devoted to
the act1vity tor a given period will in4icate ~he
~ime spen~ 1n each ~ask.
The comparison ot production with time tor each task. as 4eveloped by Work
Sampling, will indicate per unit time.

3.

Average actual is a me~hod tor es~ablishingunit
times through ~he averaging ot actual production
tor a given per10d ot time. In most cases, aver-age actual will be determined by a s1mple arithmetic average. However, abnormal times w111 be
excluded trom the averaging.l3
-

Any of the above methods yield a t1gure based on actual or
levelled t1me. 14 These tigures must be ••nverted by use ot such
allowances as

10.

p~rsonal,

fatigue, delay and incentive opportunity.

-Cont1nuous reading method is a t1me study method 1n
Ib1d~

11.
which the timsp1.ce runs continaously. Readings are taken at
breaking points and the observed elemental times are obta1ned by
subtraction.
12. Snap back method is where the watch is returned to zero
at the beginn1ng ot each element, reading the observed time at
the end ot the element.
13.

Anonymous Procedures Manual.

14. Levelled time is determ1ned by compar1~ an operator's
performance or etfective ettort with the observer s own concept
ot proper performance as compared to a bench mark.
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The

consultant~

procedure shows the charts used in Calculat1ng

and converting to develop standard time values, but he has
requested that they not be included in this st)J,dy.

Bas1cally"

they are similar to any standard time study or work sampling
averaging sheet •.
The American SeatUlg Company plan (Plan NO.3) uses still
another type of standard, namely that of a historical record,
revised by a predetermined method to cover normal changes in
operating budgets which are the standards, applying the appropriate required quantities, for a given cost::based on the level
of operating activity.

Only those

beyond the control of the

oosts that are olearly

H• • •

partic1pant--~w

tuations, taxes of all kinds, insurance,

material price fluc-·

etc'~

are excluded as

standards. IS
Through t1me study, predeterm1ned time values and average
typing apJt8ds P1tney Bowes (Plan No.1) developed rates for
various cler1cal funct1ons.

A sample of the composition of a

typ1cal typ1ng standard is shown 1n Table II from the text of
Mr. Brooks' lecture.
In analyzing this etandard data, one may observe that all of
the elements of typ1ng a letter trom a d1ctaphone.

Many of the

elements would be similar in all d1ctaphone rates, requ1r1ng only
a change of the var1able elements such as number of 11nes, number
of copies, etc.

15.

Elements such as number seventeen--allowance for

He1dgen, p •. lOl.
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TABLE II
DEVELOPMENT OF A TYPIOAL TRANSORIBING RATE

Premise:

A standard type letter is dictated by B. J.
Hotairt~ Vice-President in charge of VicePresidents. The letter consists of ten
lines of type in the body and requlres t1 ve
carbon cop1es. The letter 1s typed by a
g1rl in Transcribing using an electric
typewriter with elite type.

Let's see how this rate would be set-1.
~

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Oheck correspondence on job to be typed.
Turn and open desk drawers.
Pick out paper tor work to be typed--(6 oopies).
Interleave oarbons (5 carbons).
Posit1on paper in machine, straighten and position
to type.
Pos1tiondi~~aphone plugs in ears.
Type data and space.
Type ins1de address and space.
Type salutation and space.
Type 10 11nes of 5t" length--Standard letter
(.195 X 10).
Type Signature, section, 1nitials, c.c." etc.
Type dictation date.
Remove ear plugs and aside.
Remove typ1ng from machine.
Remove carbons and aside.
Attach letters to correspondenoe with clip
and aside.
Allowance tor erasing one error and correcting (1 every 10 lines) (6 ooples).
Change diotaphone roll (.0223 per line X
10 11nes).

lltd.M1!i

.143

.026
.286
.455
.182
.065
.018
.286
~065

1.950
.299
.046
.065
.033
.052
.143
.832
.223

-Allowed TimeLIn mln~
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eraa1hg, were of course, based on averages of several stud1es.
The 24% app11ed at the end of the abeve calculat10n 1s for personal, fat1gue and delay allowances.
TABLE III
STANDARD ALLOWED TIMES
TRANSCRIBING DEPARTMENT
f'

;

T1me Allowed 1n Mlhutes--El1te 'l'ype--Electnic

~..aah1ne

Ne •. of 11nes S1mp- Stan- Inter Ne •. of lines Branch No.of Techn'l.
In Body
In Body
l1t1ed dard Ott1ce
Memo L1nes L1ne ot
41'" 51t

1
2-3
4
5
6
7

1
2
3
4
5

6

H

41"" 5-t M 6j1t

6~"

1

2

3
4
5

3.21
3.71
4.21
4.71
5.21
5.71

T~e

-

1
3.58 1-2 1
4.08
2
2
3
4.58 4-5 3-4 3
5.08
6
4
5
5.58
6
7
5
6.07 8-9 7
6

3.39
3.89
4.19
4.89
5.39
5.88

1

3.63
4.17
4.70
5.23
5.77
6.30

2

3
4
5
6

.64

1~2a

1.91
2.55
3.19
3.83

any of the common types of study
Thus , 1t , is seen that almost
...

,.

'.

.'

,

..

;

<

'.

~

•

may blt used 1n the studylng and. establ1shment of 1ncentlves tor
cler1cal 1nd1rect labor.

All of these standards were very costly

to develop and took a great deal of skill and imag1nat1ons, yet
most of the" sources 1ndlcated that the 1ncent1 ves were sav1ng
them money, as much as a thousand dollars per worker per year
after admln1strat1ve cost, and extra earn1ngs pald oufl. 16 All

of

whlch speaks well for one company's clerlcal 1ncent1ve exper1ence.
Methods 2!

~termln1ng

16 •. Brooks, p •. 16.

Performance.

Determ1n1ng employee's
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performance must be a much eas1er process than develop1ng the
standards~

because it 1s some&h1ng to be done perpetually if the

incenti.ve plan endures.

Bas1cally~

performanc.e 1s calculated

by apply:ilng the standards to the un1ts of production to arr1ve
at the earned or standard hours.

These in

turn~

when div1ded

by the actual hours of the 1ndiv1dual or crew yield the pertormance of the 1nd1v1dual or crew.

Although, the f1nal calculat10n

is simple"many means of arriving at this calculation will be
shown in this section.
In the aforementioned Pitney Bowes Plan (Plan No.1) per.t'ormance was determ1ned by the clerical people entering their own
units of production on the employees performance record shawn
in F1gure 1.
From th1s performance record, accounting people apply the
standards to come up with the standard hours, which when div1ded
by the actual hours will reveal the performance of the 1ndividual.
Table m shows a typical set of standards trom an incentive prerate sheet. 17 On the consultant developed plan~ be1ng entirely
on a group basiS, standards are applied Similarly, to the abov.
plan, to 71eld standard hours, and others which do not, are shown
1n Table IV representing a typical incent1ve group.
Though appearing more complex, this calculation is still

17. A prerate sheet is a form containing standards per
Variable unit, Which when such un1ts are entered and extended,.
w1ll reveal the total standard per major activity.
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FIGURE 1
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE RECORD

PERFORMANCE RECORD

Sect10n

Operat~r

Date

Time

Job

Descript10n

Unrated Rated

IStandard
j

i

Start1ng T1me

\

Totals

,

Eff1clency

Form No. 2841

%
i

g
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TABLE IV

CALCULATION OF PERFORMANCE

Performance

1.
2.

%Realization

3.
4.

Measurable
Non-measurable
Supervisory and Statt
Total

5.

6.

7.

e.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.

%of

72.2%

87.5%

Measurable hours covered

People

8

3
2

13

Hours

215.6

Standard hours earned
on incentive
Lost time
Not on incentlver:
a. Regular jobs
b. Special Jobs
Total
Non-measured
SUpervisory and Staft
Total hours paid

280.Q
20.0

15.0
5.0

320.0

120.0
80.0

520.0

Computation:
Line 1

= (Line
7 r
t

Une 2 -

Line 7

Line 8

Line 8+ Line 11

(Line lOa

r lOb))

.,. Line 11
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little more than earned hours divided by actual.

In this measure

however, the performance figures do not yield the incentive payment direct.

Since budgeted performance standards can not exce.d

one hundred percent, signif1cantly, if the standards ax'e properly
developed, a chart must be used to compute the incentive performance based on the per cent real1zation of the budget •. Those
hours not included as measured ax'e, of course, pa1d the base rate.
The American. Seating Plan (Plan No.3) as a budget performance plan, looks at the dollanrv. saved from operating at less than
the budget.

The amount of money that the crew receives is based

on how much money is saved, with all "Middle l.u..nagement" employees
getting a percentage of the money.

No performance percentage is

calculated as such, but a sharing of the incent1ve pool bas1s 1s
used.

Th1s pool d1str1bution will. be explained later in this

Chppter in the section on distribution of earnings.
Periods 2! Calculation

.2! Incentive Performance. Much of the

effectiveness of an incentive is gained by the manner in which
payments are tendered.

In the earliest days of incentives when

piecework was in vogue" workers would present their days production, or other reflections of the days production to the employer,
he gave the workers so many pennies per unit, or even fractional pennies per unit.

Employers had the distinct advantage of

knowing exactly what the labor costs were for a given step of
process.

the~

Workers were at the mercy of employers who may tighten

the standard when workers became skilled or worked very hard,
resulting in a new requirement of more pieces per hour.

h
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Today~

because of the complexities of products and the

strengthening of labor unions, manufacturers are no longer able
to tighten rates at will.

Thus, management must develop incent-

ive plans more carefully in order to avoid setting loose rates. l8
For direct labor, this is relatively easy with pre-determined
time values and stop watoh training methods, but for indirect
labor, many of the measures used are more subjective.

Many of

these plans involve extreme complexities in measur1ng the period
over wb1ch earnings are oalculated.
Perhaps the most complex period of calculat10n of incentive
earn1ngs discussed thus far is that of the American Seat1ng
Company plan.

In th1s budget yardst1ck plan the payment 1s eased

on a yearly basis w1th a quarterly prepayment of the yearly
bonus.

Th1s payment was done to "t1e the 1ncent1ve reasonably

close to the groups etfort~19
The Pitney Bowes Plan (Plan No.1) and the Consultant plan
(Plan No.2) both pay 1ncent1ve on a weekly average of weekly
performance, except for occupations 1n the consultant plan,
which are su1table tor

~1ly

performance caloulations.

These are

class1fied as other than jobs "restricted to employees conf1ned
to desks and w1 th a h1gh degree of olerical Prof1cUtnC,:20

For

18. Loose rates are those that y1eld earnings in excess of
those warranted by the performance.
19.

He1dgen, p. 100.

20.

Anonymous Prooedures Manual.
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these latter jobs, performance is calculated on a daily bas1s,
averaging all days under standard as be1ng one hundred per cent
performance,

Such a measure tends to ra1se performances, since

(

poor performance days are not recognized, but th1s method recogn1zes days wh1ch the amount of work ava1lable 1s d1minished and
the workers wwld not be able to produce more lf they w1shed to •.
Close supervls10n must be supplled to assure that the workers do
not save work to do on certaln days, thus allowing for fantast1cally higher performances, wh1ch would yleld exceptional weakly
perfomanc.es when
Control .2!

ave~d

Earn1ngs~.

with the poor performance days.
Measures such as the above, prevent

earnings from falling too low, when there 1s alikelihood of such
an event.

But what about earn1ngs belng too hlgh.

If the h1gh

payment ls Justified, it should be pald" but not if there is a
phys1cal l1mit beyond wh1ch people cannot possibly work.

FUrther,

because of the method of calculat10n of perfomance and payment,
overpayments would be made if controls were not establlshed.

The

American Seatlng Plan (Plan No.3) is the one most susceptible to
such overpayments of any plan dlscussed thus far.
Th1s ls so because this incentive plan has lts quarterly·
prepayment feature and. the rules 1mpl, "The men are not, ot c()ume
requlred to return any portlon ot •.•.•. prepaymen'" and "At the
end of

,be

year, however,. all is forglven and. the partlclpants

all start the new year w1th a zero balance in the pool:2l

OVer

payment is avoided as much as posslble by establlshing a per c,ent

21.

• 100.

of potent1al hours payable, based on another control of maximum
per cent of potential hours payable, based on another control

ot maximum per cent et hours that Iliay be pa1d.. The maximum per
cent of hours, when mult1plied by the monthly payroll 40llars
1nd1cates the max1mum potent1al bonus dollars that

~y

be pa1d.

The pool dollars div1ded by the potent1al bonus dollars equals
the per cent of potent1al bonus, payable.

This is cumulated

quarterly and the employees rece1ve the potent1al bonus payable
mult1pl1ed by the number of dollars 1n the pool. The table on22
the next page (Table V) shows a hypothet1cal worksheet ot the pI
The quarterly cumulative total of l1ne E represents the
amount ot bonus pa1d out.

It 1s easy to see that 1f the balance

of the year had PQor performance, nth the no returning of prepaymentIUle, the employees would take home h1gher earn1ngs than
they are el1g1ble for.

If the plan were on a three month payment

bas1s, whatever earn1ngs would be atta1ned, would rlghtrully
belong to the employees, ~ and 1f' the company operated at a loss
the rest of the year, the employees would rece1ve the1r base
rate 1n much the same sort of way as the consultant da1ly bas1s
plan, except that the calculat10n per10d 1s much greater.
Management ga1ns an edge 1n hav1ng max1mum potent1al earn1ngs,
allow1ng them an extra marg1n of prof1ts 1f cost performance has
been excellent beyond the po1nt of the potent1al bonus.

Once the

potent1al bonus has been ach1eved, the ent1re proceeds of' the

22 •. Ib1d,.p •. 99.

-'

~o

TABLE V
HYPOTHETICAL WORKSHEET
~O omlttegj'
IRerer.

~!

to
Text

FTRqrp OTTIJ('l'v.R

std. Budget (all
Line J. It'aot. d1r. and
1nd1r. costs).
L1tle E!Actual Costs
Savings or

aL08SXC-A-B)

Jan. ' Feb.

r

Mar•.

Rtr.l'! mrn OTT 4RTER
~

Aj)r. Miy

I

$1000 1 #1100 i #1200

#1000

41000

11200

900

1050

1000

960

1000

1000

100"

(50)

200

50

100

200

~ount crad. to
L1ne DF<frt1c. PO')l
n: 50 XC'

50

(25)

100

25

50

100.

L1ne E puJDulat1ve pool

50

25

125

150

200

300

100

200

303

406

509

612

121"%

41%

37%

39%

49%

L1ne

:

Line

~Ulat1ve

. onus

Paten.

I

~ of Poten. Bonus
lUna GPayable(G: E f F)

I

50%

I
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budget performance is retained by management.
Distribution

2!

Earnings.

The Ameriaan Seating Incentive

(Plan No.3) is unique in its division of the incentive pool:
One-Balf ot the variance is credited to the incentive pool (Line D)(previously illustrated) •.••
L!able II It is based on the assumption that 50%
of the savings made through the cost reduction
efforts of these men is reasonable and sufficient
incentive for them to work towards those savings.
Th1s,"50% of saTings~ then,. is put into a pool every
month.. Notice linG E • •• The pool is cumulative •.
Actual. coats in January were $10,000 under standard
costs •. Half of the savings (#SOOO) wa.s put into the
pool. In February, actual costs were #S,POO in excess
of standard.' So half of the loss of $2,SOO was deducted from the ppol, making the cumulative pool for the
first two months only #2 SOOO.. In March, savlngs
amounted to #20,000, so #lO,POO was added to the pool •.
It brought the cumulatlve pool to 1122500. That, then, ls
where thelncentive money comes from. 3
Thls pool ls thendlstributed to three groups "depending

~pon th~

effect

a

man ln a glven job ma.y have on

costs~24

There.1s a 35% group--ellg1ble for 1ncentive pay up to
a maxlmum of 35% of their base salary. This group'
includes such men as productlon superintendents, plant
engineer, the chlef industrlal englneer. About 10% of
the particlpants fit lnto this group.
There is a 2S% group prlnclpally of foremen, but includ-ing methods engineers, office supervisors, etc. It ls
by far the largest group"includes about 7S% of the
partlclpa.nts.
Finally, there is a lS% group largely of office staff
people who have the least potential effect on costs.25
The remaining lS% of the partlcipants are ln this group.

23.

~.

-

24. Ibid.
2S. Ibid."p. 98.
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These categor1es were based on exam1natlon ot Job descr1p-tiona uslng objectlve cr1teria as the determlnat10n ot an 1nd1v1duals etfects on costs.
The other plans ment10ned ln thls chapter all pay elther
the same percentage ot incent1ve earnings to all members ot
a group 1nce,nt1 va, or the part1cular 1ndividuals incentl va earnlngs where he ls on an 1ndlvldual inoentive basls.

CHAPTER III
INCENTIVES FOR INDIRECT JOBS IN THE FACTDRY
Lev.is Included., Everyone thinks of factory workers as
people who make t.hings.

From the distance this istrue.

A dis-

tant look into a factory reveals many people busl1y, phyaical1y
engaged.

Stepp1ng 1n closer one sees that they are not all mak-

1ng the product.

Some are un1oad1ng raw material from a truck

ln a recelvlng department., ot.hers are de11verlng 1t to the stock
room.

There, people are stock1ng or pu111ng mat.er1a1 trom st.ock

to be de11vered to the noor.
11ng

.'lQan may be seen mater1a1 hand--

to the manufacturing floor. another may take the material

and place 1t 1n stock trays or shelves at a worker's st.at1on.

Perhaps, the workers mach1ne is belng repa1red, atter which a
janitor cleans up the mess.
must test Gr

insp~ct

When the product 1s made, people

1t to make sure that 1t 1s up to satisf'ac--

tory qua11ty standards.

Then a mat.er1a1 handler takes it t.o be

packed and shipped or to another stock room tor u1t1mate packing
and shipping.,
All of the above occupat1ons have nothing to do w1th mak1ng
or shap1ng the product" yet take them away and the tactory will
cease to operate.

Allot these operations are essent1a1 in

virtually every factory.

I

They are the people to whomt.he least

at.tent1on has been paid over the years.

They are t.he arter1es ot

the factory through whom t.he l1te blood ot the manufact.uring runs.
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TEiey are the indirectt labor in the factory.

Table VI detu1s the

occupations covered in tbta chapter and the pages on wh1ch the
var10us types of plans and occupat1ons will be covered.

TABLE VI.

INCENTIVE PLANS DISCUSSED IN THIS CHAPTER

Plan No.

Occupat1ons Covered (Company)

PageE References"

5.

Janitor (Industr1al Eng1neer1ng Hand-book) ;

39.

6.

Inspecters (ITT-Kellogg)

39, 46.

7.

Testers (ITT-Kello,gg)

39, 47, 59, 64.

8.

Material Handler & Set Up (Anonymous
Communications Company)

40, 48, 68.

9.

Packing and Shipping (Avon Products)

37, 43, 59.

1'0.

Steel Load1ng into Barges (Anonymous
Steel Company)

33, 35, 42, 57.

11.

Scrap Handllng (Anonymous)

33, 36, 42, 58.

1a.

Ut1llty Generat1ng(Anonymous)

37, 45, 60.

13.

Ma1ntenance (U. S. Navy, T. H.)

41, 49.

14.

Maintenance (Bay states Abras1ve)

15.·

Ma1ntenance (Unlon Carb1de)

41, 50, 61, 62,
64, 68.
41.

16.

General Utility Crew (Anonymous)

41, 52-57, 63,
65, 66.
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faere's a well established trend toward a high-er ratio of indirect to direct labor. If th1s 1s
true of manufacturing 1n general, then it's true of the
majority of plants. That means 1t's on its way to you.
1f' you haven't already not1oed the change 1n your plaDt •.
Now 1f work measurement 1s to cont1nue to be a useful
tool for the control of production and costs,. its applicat10n to ind1rect. work has to 1ncre&se.~
In a recent survey by Factory magaz1ne of' se.en hundred and

eighty-f1ve plants 1n var10us types of' manufactur1ng, the answers
to many 1ncent1ve quest10ns were 1nd1.oated to show the quant1ty
and nature of d1reot and 1nd1reot 1ncent1ve coverage.

Table VII

shows the percentages of employees 10 var10us oocupat10ns that
are covered by measurements baaed only 011 plants that actually
use labor measurement" only three hundred and two of the seven
hundred and eighty-f1ve 1n the survey.2
This chapter w111 show several d1fferent 1ncent1ve plans for
the ooverage of ma1ntenance based on the exper1ences of several
compan1es treatment of the most ind1rect of 1nd1rect groups to
be d1scussed •. Mater1al Handling crews for more repetit1ve and
less repet1t1ve types of' work w111 also be d1scussed.. A pack1ng
1noent1ve and normally

tho~ght

of as impossible-to-measure

1nspeotor incent1ve and a test1ng 1ncent1ve w111 also be included.
Un1que steel 10ad1ng 1nto barges·- (Plan No. 10) and scrap handling
(planNo. 11) w1th cranes w111 be oovered 1n this chapter.
Assorted ut1l1ty generating stations (Plan No. 12) will also be
~---<.

1. Robert S •. Rice, "The Truth about wa~~nc\~~tl~eV~
Work Measurement '1'04ay: Factory, CXVII(Apr11, 1959),i,.r'7~!..l\
'-

2.

Ib1d. p. 74.

,

<a~"

U r~ .'v C R S I TY

"
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ment10ned briefly.

Nearly all of

are of the crew type.

the incent1ves to be covered

A discuss10n of the mer1ts of a crew

1ncent1ve versus 1nd1vidual 1ncent1ve w1ll be 1ncluded 1n the
section on the d1str1but1on of earn1ngs.

TA.J31JC VI I

PER CENT OF VARIOUS OODUPATIONS COVERED IN PLANTS THAT
USE

INCENTIVEJf

Base: 302: 100%

D1rect:

% Of Plants That"
Measure

99%

Indirect:
Mater1als Handled
Rece1v1ng and Sh1pp1ng
Tool and D1e Serv1ce
Inspect10n
Housekeeping
Ma1ntenance
Other:
Cler1cal Shop

33%
36~

11%

35%

14%

13%
5%

Yarkst1cks £! Product1on.. The select10n of a. yardst1ck of
product1on that is reflect1ve of the crews efforts is far more
diff1cult for the indirect jobs 1n the factory, than 1t 1s for
the direct jobs.

In the ease of the direct jobs" the worker

1s actually touching the product and it is generally far more
repet1t1ve.

W1th the 1nd1rect workers"this 1sn't necessarily

35
the case.

Direot measurements are greatly preferred to indirect

measurements since they tie the work produced more closely to
the 1ndividual) However" direct 1ncent1ves are not always so
eas1ly developed for 1ndirect groups because of the unrepet1t1ve-ness and general remoteness of the work.. Both d1rect and ind1rect
yardst1cks will be d1scussed in th1s sect10n.
~he

f1rst yardsticks to be d1scussed are two 1ncent1ve plans

using the d1rect type of measurement •.

~he

repet1t1veBess of the

operat10ns read1ly allowed th1s type of measure to be used.
plans are 1n ex1stence 1n

&:

These

large steel company whose engineer

requested that ne1tb.er his name, nor the company's name be used.
One of these two plans 1s an 1ncent1vecover1ng loading crews
engaged 1n the load1ng of barges (Plan No. 10) w1th var10us sem1f1n1shed steel products and unloading of bulk raw mater1als: 4
Un1ts

£!

Production

A.

~he standards for load1ng product to barges
or boats are based upon the un1ts of 11fts
of mater1al loaded accord1ng to type and s1ze
of product and type of barge or boat.

B.

The standards for unload1ng raw materials are
based upon the units of 100 tons of mater1al
handled accord1ng to t'ype of material and
lift1ng dev1ce used.

C.

The standards per parge are baaed upon the number
of barges loaded or unloaded class1f1ed by
type of barge cover and whether started or
f1n1shed.

D.

The standards for turn preparat10n are based

3.

See p •. 1 •. n •.

4.

Anonymous Incent1ve

Appl~cat1on

standards Manual.
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upon the crane hOllrs worked dur1ng the pay
per10d.
Thus we see number of l1fts of product"100 tons of mater1al,
type of barge loaded, and crane hours worked as the yardst1cks or
product10n 1n th1s plan.

!he other plan based on a similar type

of yardst1ck is for a scrap and bulk mater1al (Plan Nt>. 11) ctrew
as well as the prov1di.ilg of general plant crane serv1ce:

-

Un1ts of Product1on
A.

Standards for 10ad1ng or unload1ng ava1lable
and unava1lable scrap" bulk mater1als fer
steel add1t1ves, l1mestone and m1scellaneous
1tems are based upon the un1ts of standard
gauge ra1lroad cars, narrow gauge cars and
trucks, class1f1ed by type ot mater1al,
crane and car or truck.

B.

standards for loading or unload1ng stock
usable 1ngots molds and stools are based
upon the un1ts of p1eces and classified
by type of crane,.mater1al and s1ze.

c. standard.s for tum preparat10n are based
upon the actual hours worked dur1ng the
pay per1od.

D.

The standard. for genera! plant serv1ce is based
upon the un1t of 100 1ngot tons produced in the
Open Hearth and Electr1c FUrnaces.5

This latter 1ncent1ve being of a more d1vers1f1ed crew 1n
1tsact1v1t1es"has the un1que feature of comb1n1ng direct and
1nd1rect:~·measurements

1nto the same 1ncentive plan •. The f1rst

three measures above, a, b and c are based on work actually
performed by the crew.

The last yardstick 1s one over which the

crew has virtually no control.

5.

Ib1d.

The measure of 100 1ngot tons was
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used as a general retlection ot the level of overall plant
activity in all production diVis1ons.

A certa1n number ot 100

ingot tons retleoted a oerta1n number of direct producing units
operating thus yield1ng the required quantity ot this inoentive
crews services being needed •. This portion of the inoentive based
on a somewhat wild yardstick acoounts for less than 10% ot the
crews hours, thus does not weigh heavily in the determination ot
t he crews performance. 6
Another incentive based entirely on the direct units ot
produotion of the indirect orew is that of the paokagingcrew at
Avon Produc!ts (Plan No.9),. Morton· Grove" Illinois •. With the
diversified items used,: oompJ.lcated by having to,t111 orders for
one hundred thousand housewite salespeople,. the units of "Orders:
"Items It and "Work1ng (trom table), tt were used as the yardst1cks ot
production.

Averages ot sizes and types of orders were used as

the basis of standards developed by the Work-Factor predetermined
time value system.

This development will be discussed in the

section of this ohapter covering methods ot measurement or
developing
ot standards.
,
A direct measurement.ot a completely different type of crew
is used in the aforementioned steel company's electricity produc-ins unit (Plan no. 12).

-A.Ibid.Helderman,

6.
"HOW to APp1l Work-Factor standards to a
Final Assembly and Packing Function, Unpublished speech delivered
- before the Work Factor Associates, Chicago, Illinois (May 1959), 2.
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Units

2! Production
A.

The un1ts of production for the equ1pment
t1me valUes are the units of total gross
MKWH generated classified by eng1ne groups.

B•. The units of actual operat1ng hours are
requ1red 1n c'alculat1ng equipment performance •.

c. '.

The un1 ts of product1on for the work t1me 8
valUes are the total gross ~dH generated.

This plan 1s d1fferent from the others previously mentioned,
in that 1t combines

equi~ent

performances, developed from items

a and. b:;.with work performanoe c to measure the crew's performance.
Normally, equipment performanoe is only thought of 1n terms of
direct crew appll.cat1ons, because a. machine or "equipment" usually
indicates that a

p~duct

is being made •. However"in the

produ~

tion of steel, electricity production is only indirectry related.
Thus, we have this crew being classified as an indirect one.

It

would be correct to state that where the final product is electricityas 1n an electric company,. this crew would be considered
as the direct crew.

But as a s1delight"think of how rew

people there would be in such an industry.

di~ect

All of the billing

clerical, maintenance"meter readers and construction crews
would be the indirect labor and would probably consitute a major
percentage of the number of people actually employed.

Similar

direct measurements of indirect crews would exist in this steel
company's generating of other types of utilities.

8.

Anonymous Incentive Appl1o:ation Standards Manual.
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The Elec1;l1onic Products Department of tbe Xellogg Division
of International Telephone and Telegrapb Corporation used direct
measurement of tt).e number of un1ts 1nspected (Plan No.6) or
tested (Plan No.7) as the basis for incentive

pa~ents.

Pre-rate

sheets are used to 4eterm1ne the number of connect10ns inspected
or tests performed to provide &omeasurement for these 1ndirect
groups.9
Industrial standards are g1ven by various cleaning mater1al
compan1es for use in the development of directly measured 1ncentive standards for janitor crews.

SUcb data. is available as t1me

required for sweep1ng (restricted), sweeping (unrestr1cted)"
mopp1ng, restricted and. unrestricted" cleaning commodes, clean1ng
sinks, waxing floors, buffing floors, etc-.

Untortuna tely, the

wr1ter was not able to ava11 h1mself of th1s mater1al at the t1me
of wr1t1ng this thesis" so further d1scuss10n will not appear
on the subject of th1s type of measure for Janitors and Cleaners.
Standards, as mentioned above, unsubstantiated by oack up data::
do appear 1n the Industrial Engineerins Handbook (Plan No. 5).10
Since there are many indirect occupations that do not read1ly
lend themselves to d1rect measurements, 1ndirect measurements must
be used, 1f workers are to be covered by incent1ves.

One such

application is that covering a mater1al hand11ng and set-up group

9.

Work Factor Standara

~,

Kellog&-ITT.

10. C•. W•. Funton, "Mea.surement of Storeroom~ Jan1tor"and
Shipping and Rece1v1ng Work:. Industr1al Eng1neeri~ HaadbDOk, ed.
H. B. Maynard (New York, 1956), p •. 3-201 •
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(Plan No.8) at an equipment company which w1shes to rema1n
anonymous.

In the1r 1ncent1ve, the yardst1cks of product1on

are "expressed 1n terms of standard hours of 1nd1rect work per
standard (produced)~ hour of d1rect work: ll

Th1s was felt ade-

quate as an 1ncent1ve yardst1ck s1nce the quant1ty of work performed by the d1rect crew causes a related quantity of work by the
crews who supply and remelve the mater1al to be worked on.

Us1ng

standard hours, rather than actual hours elf the d1rect creW's
CQ.uses the 1nd1rect workers to rea11zecthat 1f an operato.r 1s
delayed by not bav1ng mater1al to work on or a backlog

~logg1ng

their work areas" the d1rect pertormance or standard hours w1ll
be reduced, and the yardst1ck quant1ty will be dimin1shed.
The subject of maintenance 1s perhaps 1ndustry's greatest
hard-to-control expenses, yet it does noth1ng toward mak1ng a
prof1t.

Noth1ng directly,. that 1s.

Naturally the direct crews

requ1rements.for properly funct10ning equipment and the tactory
layouts are strongly felt, but. 1t:.1s the 1nd1rect crew of ma1ntenance that most sat1sfies thesecnee4il.
the grandest,:largest indirect

c~ew

Thus we have probably

ot them all, the ma1ntenanc&:

crew.
In the quest for control of this 1ndustrial profit eater,
cons1derable

imag~natlon

has been shown 1n the development of

measures ot performance used as the basis of 1ncentive performance.
Yardsticks of both the d1rectand 1ndirect type of measurements

11.

Anonymous Incentive Estab11shment Gu1de.

are used for ma1ntenance crews, rang1ng fxom deta11ed standardized
task 11sts, having a set standard for each of several types of
act1v1t1es (Plan No. 13),12 through counts of the number of jobs
done (Plan No. 14),13Job est1mates (Plan No. 15),14 and finally
the bases of standard 1nd1rect hours be1ng earned by a relat10nship to standard d1rect hours as used 1n the foreg01ng material
handler and set-up occupat10n 1ncent1ve.

The yardst1ck used for

a general ut111ty crew (Plan No.16) 1s a fantastiaally complex
1ncent1ve based on the earned standard hours of approx1mately
two hundred d1fferent d1rect lncent1ve arews vary1ng from
prosperlty to;recesslonlevels ot operat1on.
Method~

.£! Measurement

~

Development

2! standards. S1no:ec

virtually every type of yardst1ck15 1s used 1n the area at
1ncent1ves tor 1nd1rect labor 1n the shop" every type of
1ve standard development 1s

used,~1ncludlng

1ncent~-

all of those mentloned

in the sectlon ot chapter II deallng w1th the methods of measure-ment or developlng of standards.

The manner of transcrlb1ng the

raw data developed 1nto 1ncentiye standards for the 1ndlrect labor
ln the f'ac,tory group w1ll be d·lscussed 1n th1s sect1on.
12.

Indust~lal

J •. U•.

Saum"" Industrlal' Engiheerlng in
Manasement,(February 1959), 6.

13. A. M•. Rob1nson, "How to Gage
CXVII (February 1959), 220~

Ma1ntenance~~

.

Ma1ntenance!outPJ1t~;,Factory!

14. C•. Gordon Saunders, "Chart Your Way to Better Ma1ntenance: Factory, CXVII (December 1959), 149.
15. A yardst1ck 1s d1fferent1ated f'rom:an method of measurement 1n that a yardst1ck 1s that wh1ch 1s measured against,.
while the method of measurement is how 1t 1s measured.
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The f1rst standard development to be d1scussed 1s that used
ln the aforementloned steel load1ng and scrap handllng 1ncent1ves
(Plan Nos. 10 & 11).

Timestud1es were taken, deta1l1ng the re-

qu1red times to do load1ng and unload1ng operaJ;1ons of the various
times handled, not1ng the s1ze of the mater1al, we1ght of material,
delays and other character1stlcs of the job 1ncludlng requlred
crew slze, dlstances traveled to load or unload, and factors of
fat1gue.

Atter determ1n1ng average tlme for 11ke eaements of

slmllar mater1al, and averag1ng delays from '. the stud1es as well
as hlstorlcal delay reports, the standard formula was applled. 16
No •.. of crew ( Cycle Time)-l.OO less (Normal tlmes of crew
Members
(
) std. allow.O-1:embers with Rest and
(personal allowance
standby T1me

l

a

f Normal T1m.es • standard T1me

Standard Tlme f Delays

=Standard

Tlme Value

The standby allowance developed 1n this calculatlon 1s requlred slnce a good deal of standby tlme 1s lncurred due to the
nature of the work.

These standards cover a crew of a craneman,

swl tchman, minlmum, up to two oranement, two swl tchmen and
four hookers, max1mum.

When the hookers are used, two are located

1n a rallroad car and two are located 1n a barge be1ng loaded,
thus, when the crane or cranes are at the barge, the car hookers
are 1dle and vlce versa.~7

It 1s ln th1s situat10n that the

16.

Anonymous Iricentlve Development D1rect1ve.

17.

Anonymous Incentlve App11cat1on standards Manual.
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standby t1me would be the greatest.

Capac1ty performances t'or

the standards 1s always lower when there 1s a good deal of standby s1nce standby t1me 1s 1ncluded 1n the standard caluulat10n
at one hundred per cent.

Basically, the worker cannot work 1f he

w1shes to, nor can the company prov1de any work to do :for these
relat1vely short spans of time.

Naturally, 1f a man could work

all o:f the t1me, he ha.s the opportun1ty to make a h1gher perfor-mance than 1t' he were not allowed to work.
labelled as a restr1cted jOb. 18

Th1s

pr1nc~ple

1s

The 1nd1rec:t measure of the scrap and. bulk mater1al crew
was developed by tak1ng the h1stor1cal crew hours charged to
the d1rect produc1ng fac11l1t1es over a per10d o:f time 1n the
plant, norma11z1ng them at an arb1trary, but equ1table percentage
and d1v1d1ng them by the one hundred 1ngot tons produced 1n the
plant over the same t1me to der1ve the standard hours per one
hundred 1ngot tons.

Any 1mprovement over,h1stor1cal performance

would be ent1rely cred1ted to the crew. 19
The Avon Products plan (Plan No.9) developed 1ts 1ncent1veE:
standards through the use of Work-Factor, coupled w1 th standa.rd
s1ze, d1stance and order s1ze averages.

The elements of work

performed by a.n operator 1n t1ll1ng an order are as t'ollows:

18. A restr1cted job 1s one on wh1ch the work of the employ- '
ee 1s subject to equ1pment, process or other operat10n l1m1ts, or,
1n wh1ch the nature of the operat1on 11m1ts the performance of
the operator.,
19.

Anonymous Incent1ve App11cat1on standards Manual.

1 •. Picking up and unfolding the order blank.
2. Looking
3~

t~r

the f1rst.item oroened.

Picking 1tem from shelf and p1ac1ng in tray.

4. Look1ng tor and picking the next item ordered" etc,.
unt11 all 1tems ordered from her sect10n have been
assembled.

5. She will then told up and replace the order blank
and push the trays to the next assembler and walk
to the tront of her sect10n tor the next order.

6. When a carton of merchand1se

has been empt1ed, she
will remove the cartorr trom the b1n and place 1t
on the conveyor where 1t w111 be removed at the
end ot the assembly line.

Certain ot these elements occur only once per each
order handled regardless ot the number of items ordered,:
others occur once per each 1nd1v1dual 1tem ordered. We
must therefor make. a d1stinct1on between the two, also,
because of the length of each sectlion must vary, 1t 1s
necessary to'cons1der walk1ng as a separate element.
Thus we have the three major variables, order variables,
1 tem variables, and walking. 20
Development of standards was made by detailed Work-Factor
analyses of the atorementioned 1tems one through s1x.

For 1tem

tour, analyses were made tor each size range of products for which
a s1gn1f1cant t1me d1fference would be 1ncurred.

These,t1mes ware

then we1ghted, to arr1ve at the average 1tem time •. Only when a
grand scale push of a single
f~m

the average used.

item~was

1n effect, was a dev1at10n

In that event, the actual analyzed t1me

was used as the bas1s of the standard for that item, with new
averages be1ng deve10ped. 21
\

20. Helderman"p. 2.

-

21. Ibid.
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In the electricity generat1ng incent1ve (Plan No. 12),. standardS

were developed by making

rat10:~dela.y

of the pertormanc.e of the crew.

(work sampling) stud1es

i'hese
stud1es cons1sted of checks
,.

made at predetermined random t1mes to reconstruct what the var10us
power plant workers do dur1ng their day, and how much idle t1me is
incurred.

By the ratio delay or work samp11ng method, elements

may be statist1cally checked baaed on the frequency of their

urence to reveal the statist1cal level of probability.

000-

The theory

ope.rates in the same manner. as an opinion population sample:
Let's take a simple example to see how it works:
Assume we want to find out how much time a. selected
machine spends on operations, set-up, maintenanoe, and
delay.
Us1ng the ratio-delay technique, we visit the
machine a predetermined number of times a day, say 10 •.
That doesn't mean every 48 minutes during an a"hour
day. That wouldn't be random sampling. We wantt.10
random samplings during the day that follow no set
pattern. We reco~ whioh element is occuring at the
instant of each visit. At the end of 10 days the
record may read,22
TABLE VIII
WORK SAMPLING STUDY

Observations
Operation
Set-up
Maintenance
Delay
Total

22.

60

~-a

10
12

-

100

Per Cent of Total
60%
18%
10%,
~
100%

Harry Lee Waddell, "Work Sampling" ,Fao:tory,CXII(Oot,1954~
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If this were an adequate size population to represent ooOOitions~

the reader could assume that 1f cont1nuous stud1es were

made in the area the probability of s1milar percentages of the
elements oocur1ng would be very good.
After the work sampl.1ng stud1es were made and. allowances
added to each element on the bas1s of the effort 1nvolved,

engineer1ng calculat10ns of what the equ1pment was des1gned to do
1n the way of product1on" were analyzed.

After su1table allow-

ances for outage t1me for repairs, a f1gure of 100 per oent capacity was developed.

Actual engine performance was determined

for the t1me that the rat10',delay stud1es were made to determ1ne
the requ1red crew performance at a g1ven of eng1ne efficiency.
From the calculat10n of work hours d1v1ded by number of MKWH
produced., ~ the standard t1me value for work performance was developed.

This was done by equ1pment groups where s1gn1f1cantly

d1fferent equipment capac1t1es were 1nvolved,<yield1ng a few standard time values to be applied depend1ng on which eng1nes would
be opeI'IiLted.
Equ1pment performances and capa01t1es were developed to show'
is established for calculating any future performance of the crew. 23
th~

standa.rd hours per MKWH produced., Thus the bas1s

The Kellogg-ITT tnspecter incent1ve plan (Plan No.6) was
developed by the

Work~Factor

mentioned pDevlously.

23.

method" s1m1larly to the Avon plan

Each element involved in inspect1ng an

Anonymous Incent1ve Applicat10n standards Manual.
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electronic assembly was detail-analyzed and averages developed
tor similar 1tems •. The elements considered included visual.
1nspect1on of soldered connect1ons,.checks with screw

~v8rs<

or wrenches tor t1ghtness of mechan1cal connect1ons, wri t1ng of
reject10n or stamp1ng ot acceptance t1ckets, based on average
faults that may be expected per unit, and other 1tems pecu11ar
to the operat1on.

Pre-rate sheets were developed whereby every

time a new type of unit was to be produced, all that would be
necessary for the Industr1al Eng1neer to do, to have anew stand.-ard., was to count the number. of soldered connvctions, mechan1cal
connect1ons, etc. After th1s, by applying the pre-rated time per
connect1on, he would have the standard for the new

un1t~

This

could be done from c1rcu1t d1agrams eliminat1ng any need for
unmeasured work"untiT the standard comes out to the worker. 24
The testor incentive (Plan No. T) was developed on the samebasis as above, except that various meter readings, d1al adjustments with knobs, switch throwing, plugs1ngs, unpluggings, recordings with sim1lar pick-ups and asides were used.

Add1tional

breaks 1n the pre-rate sheets were added to allow a lesser standard where units were put aside when & defect was found that
prohibited further testing of the unit.

This cond1tion was not

prevalent in the inspection incentive, since operation of the unit
was not a criteria of

th~job~

No incentives ha,d"been developed

yet for trouble-shooting the sets put aside since the variety

24.

Work-Factor Standard Data

Kellogg-ITT.

of troubles was too varied, and the quantities of a given unit
were generally too small.

Although a prescribed troubleshooting

path could have been developed, it would have

hamp~red

the

ope~

ator's skills since trouble-shooting is a scienoe varying with
the location of where the operator got his skill and tralning. 2 5
Standards were developed for the material handler-and setup group (Plan No.8) on the bas1s20f the relationship of earned
standard hours ot the direottcrew to requ1red hours of the indirect crew., Work sampling studies were made to determine the performance of the indirect crew and the number. of hours spent in
each department.

When performance was established, the required

hours for each department ~was determined.

THe standard hours

earned by the direct c'rew was then divided 1nto then required
hours plus allowanoes to der! ve tb.eearned standard hours of the
indirect crew per earned standard hours, or the direct crew, or
in short, the incentive s$andard to be applied to the particular
department. 26
This type of standard development is fa1rly common, but it
is_interesting to see the comment that Phil Carroll, noted incent;,

authori ty has about this exact type of measurement of set-up men
"This sort of incent1ve 'formula' is CODllDDnly used to pay more
money to set-up men.

But what many overlook is that often, when

the set-up man works, the operator is idle.

25.
26.

Then when the

oper~

Ibid.
-Information
der1ved from source who wishes to remain
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ator takes,'over, the set-up man is idle.

Obviously, the produc-

tivity of the operator is not a measure of the set-up man's
contribution: 27
Since in the situation studied there are about four to five
material handlers to each set-up man, and the fact that the
"operator is idle~ as Mr. Carroll says, means that the operator
can only attain one hundred per cent performance, as base rate
less direct hours can be applied to the standard.

This would be

a major contribution toward lower performance for the indirect':
workers.

Thus, he could raise his own performance by gettlng the

operator back to work more quickly.

Bearing these facts in mind,

there is little enough b.anIt·in using this ratio type incentive'"
in this particular application.
Considering the mass of yardsticks used in measurlns maintenance crews, standards were found developed in every imagine-able way.

One company used a ratio method and work sampling s1m-

ilar to the previously mentioned material handler set-up

occupa~n

incentive.
The United states Nayy at Pearl Harbor (plan No. l3)iused
what it called "Engineered. Performance standards"28 in whioh '
allowances for delay and fatigue were added to expert bench mark
standards to develop

27.

various types of activities.

Phil Carroll, Better Wage Incentives (New York, 1957),.

p. 90.

28.

s~andardsfor

Sawn, p. 6.
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The Bay state Abrasl ve Produa:ts Company (Plan No. 14) ot'
Westboro, Massachusetts based lts lncentlve plan on the hlstCrlClll
tlme requlred for malntenance work.. The average t,imes used for
Jobs were broken lnto groups of less slgnlflcant tlme dlfferences.
From these groups the average actual tlme spent on the Jobs of
the group was derlved.

By countlng the actual number of work

orders or Jobs;, performed ln the group, the percentage of all the
Jobs done was derlved.

This percentage multiplied by the average

time of the group yleJ.ded the lncanti ve factor ror the group•.
The se factors when total.led ylelded the

ove~a11

standard for

the crew •. Incentlves were based on a fifty-flfty sp11t of extra'
work between the inc:entl ve crew and thB

companYt~

l t performana

earnlngs were over the hlstorical performance •. The fol10wlng
lllustrations show the ac~ua~ summary data for the lncentlve
standards: 29 (Tables IX and X)
This lncentive ls equltab1e wlth lts fltty-tifty split ln
that it ,recognlz.ed that pastpertormance of the crew may haYe
been well under one hundred per cent, as it is ln most unmeasured
operatlons.

Also, a crew golng on lncentives with llmited meth-

ods descrlptlons, as exlsted here, can devlse all sorts of short
cuts.

Such short cuts are noxm&lly dlctated by management and

most union contracts recogniz.e management's right to improve! the
way in wh1ch the Job is'<ione.

Management ls fortunate here ln

29. Raymond H. Tolman, "Simpler Malntenance
Factory, CXVII (March 19595" 170-171.

Incentlve~
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TABLE IX
HOW BASIC DATA ARE DERIVED

Per10d
Tested

Done

On

3 Months
Average
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TABLE X

HOW RATES ARE SET UP

Group

Rate (hours)

0-3.9 Hours
4-7.9 Hours
8-15.9 Hours
16-31.9 Hours
32-49.9 Hours
50-Hours and up

%Jobs

1.44
5.56
11.00
22.30
38.80
98.60

hav1ng the workers f1nd the short

Doner.

Factor
0.98
.76
.95
1.09
.75
3.0a

67.90
13.60
8.60
4.85
1.93
3.12

Ct1t~Land

sa.ves 1ndustr1al eng1neer1ng methods

t1me~

appl.Y1ng them.. Th1s
Although management.

1mprovements are made and recorded, no change 1n the rate had been
made 1n the four, years s1nce the plan was 1nsta.l.led.

Proof' of the

degree of success 1n the plan 11es 1n the statement, IfF1rst, 1 t
-

hasn't been too t1ght a rate because the men have cont1nuously
made a fa1r bonus.
sampl~ng

Second, it hasn't bean too loose because work

observations indicate the men st1ll have to db a fa1r

day's work to earn

bonus~30

The f1nal plan to be 1ncluded as an 111ustrat1on of the development of standards 1sthe stael company plan for a ut111ty
producing d1v1s1on (Plan No.

16)~

The development of this incant--

ive describes a concept1on that requ1red nearlywo years until the
plan reached 1nstallation.

The plan encompassed the drawing-off

and analys1s of hundreds of thousands of f1gures and 1s an

30.

-Ib1d.,

p •. 174 •.
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outstanding reflection of the usefullness and maintenance of good
histor1cal records.

The steps of development are outlined 1n

the follow1ng manner: 31
1. From the standard. cost ut111t1es budget:was
determ1ned the quant1ties of ut111t1es prov1ded to each
d1rect produc1ng unit by percentage (ut111t1es furn1shed
to ind1rect functions were either assoc1ated to the
most closely assoc1ated d1rect produe1ng fac1lity or
pro-rated over all d1vis1ons, reflecting the general
level of plant operat1ons). This was done for each
ut111ty,.whose people were to be 1ncluded 1n the plan.
2. From the Power D1v1s1on actual hour report,
the number of hours worked by each occupat1on 1n eaeh
facility were obta1ned.
3. Actual Power d1v1s1on hours were cons1dered
1n the light of Power Dtvis10n crew schedules to determ1ne wh1ch occupat.,1ons are f1xed in so far as the occupation being requ1red at. certain levels of operat1on,
and which were var1able, dim1n1sh1ng in direct proportion to a p~e-establlShed cond1t1on.
4. PowerD1v1a1on Ma1ntenance aharges, by fac111ty
charged, .,and. outs1de ma1ntenance hours for occupations
which also appeared 1n the maintenance crew were obta1ned"mak1ng allowances for appropriat1on work. Appropr1at10n work was considered as spec1al jobs not normally
fal11ng 1n the scope of work performed by the ma1ntenance
crew •. OUts1de ma1ntenance hours were cons1dered, s1nce:';
these const1tuted extra hours prov1ded as ass1stance
for the crew.

5. Total Power D1v1s1on hours were de#eloped for
the crew to be 1ncluded 1n the plan at the current aver...··
age, reference per10d level of general plant operat1on.
6. Standard company allowances were appl1ed to
the Ind1rect Actual hours after applYing the performance factor developed from rat10 delay stud1es"to
der1ve the Power D1vis1on requ1red hours or the ref31. This 1nformation', has been expla1ned 1n much deta11
through the courtesy ot~ the Industr1al Engineer who developed
this plan and his company.. It is their request to rema1n anonymous.
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erence

p~r1od

level of operat1on.

1. Requ1red hours were mul t1p11ed by the perc.ent-ages derived from the forego1ng paragraph 1, to y1eld
the requ1red number of power d1v1s1on hours for each
d1rect producing d1v1s10n for the reference period.
8. For the D1rect Crew levels, the a7erage operat-ing levels of each direct producing d1vis10n was established, to 1nclude·· such th1ngs as number of blast fur-·
naces operat1ng, number of furnaces in eaoh steel produc1ng facility, number of rolling mill turns (sh1tts)
for rol11ng m111a, and operat1ng hours per pay perlod
for conditionlng ta.ci11t1es. Mill turns (shltts) for
non-lncent1ve groups were establlshed and related to
100 tons of productlon at a g1ven level. Ult1mately,
the determinant of 100 tons would be used for incent1ves
1n such non-1ncent1ve area, at wh1ch t1me appropr1ate
changes would be made 1n the indirect lncentive to
reflect only the change of cond1t1ons of the directcrew.

9. The crew schedules of the dlrect produclng
fao11lt1es were. noted to prov1de the Basls of determining the direct crew hours and var10us levels 01'
operat1on by 1ndiv1dual producing d1v1s10n.
10. Ac,tual hours tor the direct crews were
estab11shed trom payroll records~
11. The 1nde~ 01' measured performance (Incent1 vee
performance) was estab11shed for each direct producing
dlvis10n tor the reterence periOd.
12. The Earned plus Unmeasured hours or the direct
crews were estab11shed from incent1ve and payroll records.
13.

Actual hours der1ved 1n sect10n 12, above,
to . . the actual crew schedule hours, der1ved
trom sect10n 9 to show the relat10nship of actual hours
to crew schedule standard hours.

ver$:'.9Qlbpared

14. By us1ng a taat or developed in 13, above,
mul t1p11ed by the crew schedule standard hours, the
actual hours to be expected at any level was derived.
15. The actual hours per: level of operation
mult1p11ed by the reference per10d 1nde~. of performance yielded the earned plus unmeasured hours that
may be expected at any g1 ven level ott: performance!" where
the direct orews would be work1ng at the same effort.
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16. The requ1red standard 1nd1rect hours deve10ped
in paragraph 7, above"div1ded by the d1rect earned standard plUs unmeasured hours at the appropr1ate dlrect crew
level of operat1on yielded. the 1ncent1ve standar'Ci for
requ1rements to a glvErldlrect produclng un1t at a given
level of operat1on to prov1de the source of the earned
1ndlrect standard hours.
The

fo~lowlng

11lustratlon:w11l show a serles of sample

standards developed., The f1gures used are purely flct1c1ous. 1n
order to assure the anon1mlty of the source:

TABLE XI
INDIRECT INCENTIVE DEVELOPMENT

Utl1ltl
X Power
Y Power}
A Ga.s
B Gas

Water Pumplng

4. Faclllty
mce. Hours

BLAST FURNACE DIVISION
1. %of Ut1lity To
2. Total Crew
Bl. Fce. D1v1s1on
Hours Worked
240

.2000

.3300
.4000

160
160

F1xe4~

All

"
tf

240.

.3400

80

.6550

5. Total. Cl'ew & Mtce.
Hours P~r Fac111ty

120

360
240

380
700

620

80
160.

3. No.

7~ Fac~11ty Hrs to
Blast Furnaces

320

780

6. Assume that 1002.0 was the ma1ntenance hours requ1red
after allowances. Speclal cons1derat1on was made of performance
where crew hours were f1xed.
8. 6.8 furnaces determ1ned to be reference perlod average
operat1ng level for reference per1od, uslng 10,000 actual hours

....=,
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TABLE XI (Continued)
INDIRECT INGENTlVE DEVELOPMENT

AT 110% ~e.rformanoe (oapaoity for direot plans 120% in th1s
divis1on).
8. Avg. No. ot Foes.
Per Pay Period

9. Crew Sohedule Hours 10. Total
(Calculated) ,
.-H-..ou,;;;;;;.,r;;.s_ _ __
9600

6.8
11. Average Performanoe

10,000

12. Bonus Hours
11.000

110%

116000 Earned Inoent. Hrs. 9161 actual hours at oapac1ty tor
12 %capacity Performance 6.8 furnaoe level of operation
9167 aotua1 hrs. 6.8 Foes.
9600 drew SCheaGle Hrsi6.S
Furnace

Level

7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0

=compared
.955 faotor of actual hours as
to
Sohedu1e hours
o~w

9. Crew Sched
Actual. Hours

14.Factor. 955 X
Crew Sc hed. Hrs.

10,000

9,550
a,l17
6,971
5,729

8,50<X~

7,300
6,000
4,500
3,000
7. Indirect Crew Hours
1,002
1,002
1,002
1,002
1,002
1,002

15. Earned f Unm
Hrs at Ref. Pd.I.ev
10,~5

8;929
7,660
6,302
4,727
3,152

4,~97

2,865

16. Ind Crew Hrs •• -Dir
E f U Hrs ••Std Time Value
.095

'~112

.131
.159
.212
.318
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Methods

2!

Determining Performance.

A performanoe caloula-

tion formula is shown for the last mentioned incent1ve described
1n the preceed1ng seot10r4, the ut1lity produoing division of a
large steel company (Plan No. 16) e.
TABLE XII

CALCULATION OF PERFORMANCE

Level Of
QRerat10n

D1v1s1on

Blast FUrnaoes 7~O Fces
Open Hearths
18.0 Foes
Rolling M1il A 20 Shlfts
Rol11ng Mill B if Shifts

Std. Time
Value

X

Dir Earned ,t.
Unmeas Hours •

~095

1201
1193
840
800

12659
10650
8400
16000

.112
.100
.050

Earned
Std. Hrs.

4034

Aotual Hours of Indireot Work - 3600
4034 Earned Std. Hours X 100
36~O

Ac£ual Hours

=113% Performanoe

The steel loading orew performanoe (Plan No. 10) 1s calcu-lated by determ1n1ng the quantity of the lifts that the m1ll which
rolled the mater1al used to load the railroad car.

The mill,

be1ng on a tonnage basis incent1ve, attempts to load the steel
1n the fewest number of (safe) lifts poss1ble.

These lifts are

then multiplied by the appropriate inoentive standard to derive""'
the standard hours for the lifts made.

Standards are similarly

applied to bulk material unloaded on the bas1s of actual tons,
ver1fied by cert1fied scales and invoice weight for purchased new
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material.

Next, the crane hours worked are multiplied by the

standard for crane service.
barge

it8~lf~

Then an allowance is made for the

based on the types of oovers used.

All of the

earned standard hours are added up for the incentive pay period
and divided by the actual hours worked during the pay period to

derive the incentive performance,

Performance is calculated by

crew shifts and by barges, which may have taken several sh1fts,
but this is done only to determ1ne weaknesses of the operat1on.
The scrap handling crew(Plan No. 11) is based on the applicat10n
of the standards to Foremen's reports of the type of material
handled and the railroad car numbers.
used for different types of cars, no

S1nce averaged weights ar'8r;
we1g~ts

are requested.

stan-

dards are also applied to certain items actual counts, such as
ingots, molds and stools.

Turn

to the crane actual hours used.

preparation standards are applied
The plant daily report of

opera~

tions is the source of the one hundred ingot tons used as the bam
of standard hours for general plant serv1ce.

A ficticious scaled

down, daily performance would appear as follows:( Table XlII)
Total one hundred ingot tons 3.5

@

2.0 standard hours per::

one hundred tons: 7.0 Earned Standard hours for the crew.

Assume:

crane shown is total grew for 1llustrat10n purposes.
Total Standard hours for cars
9~6
Total Standard hours for turn pr~I.6
Total std. Hrs. for Plant Serv1ce 7.0
Total Standard Hours
18.2
Total Standard Hours - 18.2
Total drew Hours Worked16.0: X 100=114% PertonnanCeE-'
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TABLE XIII
FOREMAN'S REPORT

Date:

Crane Operator: 31-106
S1gnalman:

;21-290
Hrs. ~ent
~r. S g.

Mat '1 Handled
No. 1 Scrap
No.4 Scrap
Unava11ab1e Hvy
Move 2 B Frames
to B1.Chg.

2
1t
1

2'2
1t
1

3t

3t

Cars Loaded
or Unloaded

Tot.
Cars

-

~L)RI

6857,CB&Ql834
U)NYC 4449
(U)PRR86104

8 Crane Hrs.

2
1
1

8Hrs.

Approved:

std.
Std. Hrs.

-2~4

2.6
2.2

4.8
2.6
2.2
"T.O

~20

1.6

~Srhrlf't~Fro~r-e-m~an~----

The Avon Products Company 1ncent1ve for packers (Plan No.9),
the Kellogg Inspecter Incent1ve(P1an No.

6);~and

the Ke11og&

Tester (Plan No.7) all' record product1on counts of the var10us
yardst1cks.

Incentive standards shown 1n tems of pteces per:

hour 1nstead of hours perp1ece, thus the ca1culat1on made to determ1ne quant1ty of payment or 1ncent1ve performance, 1s as
follows:
Pleces or Unlts'Produoed
Standard Pleces Per Hour·

Produaed Hours (Earned Hours)

Payments are actually made on produced hours although an
1ndex of performance would be developed by the standard formula:
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of produoed hours d1vided by aotual hours t1mes one hundred
equals the 1ndex of performanoe.
The performanoe oaloulat1on for the eleotr101ty produotng
group would be as follows:
TABLE XIV

PERF.ORMANCE CALCULATION

Assume the following oond1t1ons for a pay per1od:
(a)

Total hours of orew

40Q

Work Performanoe Caloulat1on

No. of Un1ts Work Perf.
Pay Period Std./Un1t

Aotual gross

~lH

Work Performed

Gen.

=~•

3000

~lOO

Total
300

75%

Equipment Perf. Caloulat1on
Eng1nes 1 through 3
2000MKWH X .150 std. Hrs./mkwh

=

300

Eng1nes 4 through 9
1000 NaGiH X .200 Std. Hrs./mkwh

-

200

Total Standard Engine Hours

5m5

Per Cent Equipment Performanoes
~OO Total Standard Ens1ne Q2erat1ns Hours X 100 •
96 Total Aotual EngIne Operat1ng Hours

100%

At th1s po1nt, the work performanoe @ 75% would be oross
referenoed to an equ1pment performanoe of 100% to y1eld the
1noentive performanoe.
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Similar plans to that previously mentioned also exist tor
other divis10ns ot the utility department 1n th1s oompany.32
Performances of the maintenance inoentives would be calculated similarly to those inoentives mentioned previously where the
yardstioks are similar.
From the rates previously shown

i~

the development section

of this ohapter, the Bay States Abrasive Produats Oompany (Plan
No. 1:4) incentive caloulat1on is shown: 33
TABLE XV'

HOW BONUS IS CALOULATED

Step 1. Number of Jobs completed th1s week

230

step 2. Actual hours worked by ma1ntenanoe,' group

1250

Step 3. Oomputation of earned hours:Detailed way

Total
Summary Vay

230 X
X
X
X
X
X

0.98=
0.760.95=
1.()9c
0.753.08-

226
175
219
251
173
708

1152

earned hours

230X 7.61&1750.3

m.g. 140%
1250
step 5. Oomputation of worker's share of 1mprovemen~~
step 4. computation of Per:t!brmanc6

Step 6.

of Bonus:
20-!um of share of 7 12rev1ous weeks
co~utation

8

32.

Anonymous interv1ew.

33.

Talman,

p~.171.
(

--

• 20%

current
% torweek
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Persons familiar with incentives may readily see that the
methods of developing performance ot incentives for indirect labor
is not really much different than the type of incentives tor
indirect labor.

A major concern in wr1t1ng incent1ves for 1nd1rect

labor 1n the factory is the cost of developing and adm1n1ster1ng
the plan.

Although development has cost a considerable amount of

money 1n many of the plans d1scussed thus far, adm1n1stration
costs, namely, determ1n1ng performance have been very low.

In

fact, when one considers the large s1zes of some of the crews
covered; fifty to three-hundred people and even more in some
installat1ons, the

appl,tng the incentive per 1nd1v1dual

costs~;:·of

covered are very small.
Periods

~

Calculat10n

~

Incentl ve Performance.

It may be

seen from the 1llustrat1on for the Bay states Abrasives plan (Plan
No. 14) that step s1x covers the use of moving averages, based on
the previous seven weeks performance be1ng averaged into the
wighth week's performance.

This plan developed by the Simplest

means possible encompasses as the
number of jobs performed.

~asis

of the yardst1ck the

Since maintenance work may vary so

readily from week to week, although it runs cons1stantly over the
long haul, this type of meving average 1s used to maintain a mere
level performance. 34

If performance were paid 1n incentive pay-

ments as it existed each week, those weeks in wh1ch the crew
worked the hardest, performance may be the poorest since the job
count would be the lowest 1f more than the normal number of long

34. Ibid.
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tedious jobs are scheduled.

However, the crew, knowing that there

will be long-jobs as well as short-jobs can look to better times
ahead.

For the initial eight payments, "you pay the first one

as calculated - and calculate the following ones on a :running
average of previous figures until you read an a-week accumulation,
thereafter, you drop the earliest of 8

weeks~

The aforementioned steel company plan for a utility division
(Plan No. 16) bas sim11ar plans developed. for maintenance crews.
Although such complexities are not present as those found in the
subject incentive, the same sort of yardstick of production is
used.

In departmental maintenance crews, as differentiated from

general plant maintenance crews, the maintenance hours requ1red
would dim1nish as the d1rect crew hours d1m1n1shed.

Any deviat10n

trom th1s practice was a result of a spec1al appropr1at1on to
allocate the funds.

Such act1v1t1es are excluded from the 1ncent-

1ve s1nce they are totally unrelated to any regularly planned
program.

In th1s company po11cy, 1t is spec1f1cally stated that

up to 6 pay per1ods, twelve weeks, mov1ng averages could be used
1n the calculat10n of performance.

However due to the large

crew s1zes and relat1vely stable level of product1on, th1s pre-rogat1ve was not taken for any of the 1ncent1ves d1scussed in
this thesis from that company.35
No shop 1ncent1ves wh1ch calculate earn1ngs on a quarterly
or annual basis for 1nd1rect labor are 1ncluded 1n th1s thesis.

-

35. Ib1d.
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Such incentives are known to exist in degrees in suoh organizationi
as the Linooln Eleotric Company and Hormel. 36 These, however, are
annual bonus type plans which are not 1ncluded 1n the sense of
incent1ve plans as used 1n this thesis.

They are more-or-less a

bonus on prof1ts as a result of better efforts of all employees
rather than bonuses on the specifics of every day operat10ns,
such as budgets, ,or beat1ng historical or caloulated sta.ndards.
,

All of the plans discussed in th1s chapter w1 th the exc,ept10n
of the Bay State Plan (Plan No'. 14), are calculated on a one or
two week pay period basis,: wh1chever is the normal pay period of
the specif1c company.
Control

2!

Earn1ngs.

Recognizing that many of the methods of

determining standards involve the use of arbitrary Judgements on
the part of the developer of the 1ncent1 ves, some companies feel
the need of building controls 1nto the incentive plans.
S1nce the Work-Factor plans previously discussed are based
as much as possible on objective scient1fic determinations, no
restr1ct10ns have been placed on the earnings of the plans.
However, in the Kellogg plan (Plan No.7) where tested electron1c
equ1pment is as1ded when a defect is found, a subject1ve problem
1s avoided.

Knowing that the time to find an electr1cal problem

in a circuit can vary conSiderably, th1s company chose to have
such work repaired on unmeasured or daywork

hours~' \" Ac,tually,

1n-

36. L1ncoln also has had piecework plans for many years, but
the extra earnings aren't nearly as great as its annual bonus.
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cent1ve cont1nued to ex1st 1n that workers work1ng on daywork37
are anx10us to return to measured work s1nce the max1mum earn1ngs
on unmeasured daywork ar&the base rate.

Ne1ther penalty nor

reward 1s given for slowness or speed for such aetiv1t1es.
An add1t10nal factor 1s app11ed as a control on the steel

com','any ut111ty div1s1on plan (Plan No. 16).

This control comes

1n the form of a standard wh1ch when app11ed y1elds the minimum
actual hours that may be used 1n the performance calcUlation.
Th1s f1gure or the actual hours 1s used as the 6enom1nator 1n the
performance calculat1on, wh1chever, 1s greater.

The use of the

m1n1mum actual hours that may be used rather than the actual hours
result in a performance 1n the area of one hundred twenty per
cent depending on the performance of the direct determ1nant crew
1n relat10n to the1r expected capaCity performances.

This max-

1mum performance 1s des1reable for two reasons.
1. S1nce d1rect crews can not achieve the1r capac1ty performances without oonsiderable effort, it
poss1ble at all, due to equ1pment capac1 ties, wage inequi--·
ties are prevented by not allow1ng the 1nd1rect crews
wages to soar ahead of the more critical Jobs of the
comparable direct crew cl~ssifications.
2. Serv1ce may suffer w1th less than the max-imum actual hours be1ng used, although this may not
show up for year~ to come 1n excess1vely deteriorated equ1pment.3 8
In the case of this ind1rect crew, management has the absol-

37. Daywork is wo~ performed which is paid on the basis of
a rate per un1t of time worked regardless of production.
38.

Anonymous Procedure Manual.
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ute discretion of maintaining the number of employees in the
indirect orew.

To prevent any 1nequity to the ind1reot orew,

management must exercise d1l1gent effort to maintain the ind1reot
orew hours s11ghtly above the m1n1mum indireot orew hours allowed.

An 1llustrat1on of the caloulat1on of the m1n1mum aotual
hours allowed standard development follows:
TABLE XVI

CALCULATION OF MINIMUM ACTUAL HOURS ALLOWED

Appropriate Standard
T1me Value (.095)

• 120% Maximum
1ntended performanoe

X

--

D1reot Earned Hours
at Capaoity Performanoe 12606

= Earned
Ind1reot
Standard Hours @
Capaoi ty Perfor-manoe 1198

Aotual Indireot Hours .Aotual Direot H~
at Capaoity Perfor@ Capaoity 10505
manoe 998

=Aotual
The Standard T1me Value
Hours Allowed

for Min1mum
.095

This f1gure divided by the standard time value for the same
level of operation yielded a faotor whioh when applied to other
standard time values in the previous example, yielded the soaled
down standard time values for maximum aotual hours allowed s.t
various levels.
value and the

In the above illustration, the standard time

standal~

time value for minimum aotual hours allowed

are equal s1noe one hundred twenty per oent is the oapacity

performance for the direct plan as well as the indirect plan.
check formula used to verify the minimum

ac~ual
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A

allowed standards

could have been used in development of the minimum actual
allowed standards could have been used in development of the
minimum actual allowed standards but was not, due to fractional
deviations which might change incentive performance.

The

formula follows:

standard Time Value
Minimum Actual Standard

x

Index of Performance
Capacity
of the Direct Crew at : 120%
Capacity
Perform.

This formula if used for development of standards for minimum actual allowed hours would appear as follows:

•

120%

.092( 12O l
x

=

120

-11.4
x

=

120

X

-

.095

.095
x

X 120%

Standard Time Value for
Minimum Actual Hours Allowed

In use, the standard time value for

minimum~actual

hours

would be applied to the actual hours of the appropriated direct
crew just as the standard time values are applied to the earned
hours of the appropriate direct crew.

After being totalled from

all direct determinant units, these hours would be used in the
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per1"ormanOB a:a1Clllatlon lf greater than the ao:ttlal hours worked
by

the lndirect crew. 39
A degree of control can be said to exist ln the Bay State

Plan (Plan No. 14) 'with lts flfty-tl:tty split of earnings over su
If the employeee run away w1th per.formance they wl1l brlng

dard.
savlng~

to the company right along w1th themselves, since when

an extra-dollar is made by the employees, an extra dollar is made
by the company. 40
An lnterest1ng oontrol to raise earnings was discovered in

one of the aforementloned plans.

Since direot workers oan produce

as much as they wish when unhampered by machine cycle tlmes or

raw materlal shortages, or slow feeds, there ls no restrlctlon on
the amount of lncenti ve that they may earn, wl th1n thelr
endurance.
workers.

Such ls not generally the advantage of
1'he

elm

human

lndlrect.~

savlngs on lnoentive depends on how few hours are'

used to do the work that ls available.

Thus a reduo·tlon of orew

becomes mandatory to the sucoess of many of these·,lndlrect lnoentlve appllcatlons.

The company whlch established the prevlously

dlscussed material handler and set-up incentive (Plan No.8) sought
to make lt an immediate success without any drastl0 reductlons in
crew size, further it was Wisely belleved that workers

oanno~

suddenly improve their werk effort to any appreolable extent.
Such lmprovement only comes as a result of gradual oonditlonlng •.

..,

39.

Anonymous lntervlew.

40.

Talman, p. 974 •

Thus, ac:handicap was given to the crew to encourage them in bringing their performa.nce up gradually.

After studying oompany tum--

over records and discussing previous standard performance atta1nment times, a, handicap was set up based on allowing that halt ot
the distance 1n pertormanc'8 p'oints between 87 and 114% to be
added on the arew's actual performance aDd used as the actual
basis of payment ot incentive.

This well served its purpose ot

allowing normal attr1tion to take its toll and a normally progressive training period to accustom remaining workers to the new
pace.

Charted, this handicap appears 1n Table

~~

It ean be seen that when the crew attains eighty-seven per
cent performance on their own,. they beg1n earning inc'entive with
the handioap.

Of course, when the;. one hundred fourteen pel'_ cent

handicap limit is

attalned~

there is no further handioap, and thet

orew stands on its own.
This hand1cap was permitted for a six-month period after
installation of the plan. 4l Other controls of earnings which could
appropriately be applied to incentive or indirect labor as well
as d1rect labor are the pay plans found in various books showing
the history of 1ncent1ves.

Gantt"Taylor, Bedaux, Rowan, Emerson

and Halsey all have prescr1bed formulae to be used 1n the ca.lou-·
lation ot 1ttcentives.

These incentive formulae generally tollow

a pattern to protect the company from loose rates, or provide a
little extra stimulus to get the worker on to a higher production

4l~

Anonymous Incentive Application standards Manual.
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TABLE XVII
INCENTIVE HANDICAP

Actual Performance

86% and under

Perf'ormanc:e
101
101

89
90
91
92
93
94

102
102

103

96
97
98
99

106
105

95

100.·
101
102
103
104
105

106

107
108

ID9

110
111

112
11;5
114

Handlcap

100% (Base Rate)

87

88

~

103
104
104
105

105
10'7
107
108

108
109
109

110
110
111

111
112
112
113
113
114
114

....
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paae •. These f'ormrulae will not be discussed further sih0'8 their use
and detall may be found in any number of places. 42

By and lal"-8"

the plans in existence in the area of' this thesis, other than those
the writer has described as personalized (to the individual
applications) splits of' earnings, are paid on a one per cent incentive f'or each one per cent of perf'ormance over the standard rate.
!pertormance of' one hundred per cent or under is paid the base rate.
Distribution of' Incentive Earnings.

In all of' these plans:.,

members of' the crew type incentives have participated in earnings
at the same percentage added to their earnings, maintaining the
higher ratio of pay for higher rated Jobs.

Individuals on nun--

crew type incentives all receive earnings based on the1r incentive·
performance.

Normally, incentive earnings are paid in the week

f'ollowing the week in which the work 1a,::perf'ormed, however, there
may be a greater lapse of' t1me if inadequate time is available in
this per-iod to compile the data, required to c'alcuJ.ate the earnings.

An interesting feature in the foregoing uti11ty plan (Plan No.
16) 1n the distr1bution of' its earnings, is a feedback of earned
hours that come in to the performance calculation f'rom another
plan.

This plan, covering general plant serv1ce contains the bulk

of the ma1ntenance crew hours.

Another port10n of the maintenance

hours are used 1n a utility plan wh1ch prov1des serv1ce to those
uti11ties which are on d1rect type measurements.

42.

P.955),

This smaller

M1chael J. Jucius, Personnel Management, (Homewood, Ill.,

p., 376.
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group's earn1ngs are based on rat10s to the1r d1rect p;-oducing
groups 1n the ut1l1ty division.

Specifying certa1n members of the

unif1ed maintenance crew to certa1n areas would impract1cal, and
management had the performance of this <trew calculated separately.
Other members of th1s departmental crew earned at the performance
of the

depa~mental

plan, whlle the malntenance hours, both earn--

ed and actual were carried lnto the seneral serv1ce plan to be
lncluded ln its performance calculatlon.

Thus, these ma1ntenance

people's performance was pald on the basls of the overall average,
rather than thelr plans average.
Th1s payment was considered just, because the lndlvldual workers efforts are performed as a part of either crew, even durlng
the same pay perlod.
Much has been sald about the benefits of crew incentlves over
indlvldual lncentlves, or vice versa•. Harold R•. Nlssley, a con-,

sultlng Englneer recently presented arguments on the subject of
indlvidual lncentlves versus group lncentlves.

Selected advanta-·,

ges of group lncenti ves whlc h are generally more sul table for
measuringrlndlrect are presented as follows:
LIndlvidua!7measurement ls time-consuming and frequently costly unless a ~anagement wlshes to take some
blg ohances<wlth hlstorical or -hunch" work standards.
Moreover a spirlt of cooperation 1s lacklng in many
individual incentive plans.
Because much time 1s frequently spent in resolv-lng operator time-study grievances, such operator
grlevances are usually reduced when a group incentive
plan is substituted for an ind1vidual incentive plan.
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Moreover, under a group incentive plan there develops
(theoretically, at least) ~ group esprit de ~
that gets out production with a minimum amo~ fuss
and fricti~~, everyone pitches in regardless of whose
job it is.
The article goes on to tell how absences of a member of a
group are less of a problem when other workers can fill the gap
to maintain their earnings.

The extra costs of installing individ

ual incentives are presented in favor of group incentives.
The disadvantages of the group plan is that individual effort
may be too diluted to yield the best efforts, standards may be
too loosely developed and the group incentives require more experience by the company, union, and the industry if they are to be
successful.
The arguments presented weigh heavier in favor of group
incentives bearing in mind that the measurement of the workers
should be as closely controlled by the worker included, as is
poss1ble.

A total plant incentive leaves the workers with the

feeling that what they may do as individuals 1sn't going to hurt
or help:.:the plan noticeably •. Thus, if all workers felt this way
the plan would yield poor performances, and the
having an incentive would diminish.

adv~tages

of

CHAPTER IV
INCENTIVES FOR MANAGEMENT

Levels Included. "Hey, boss'. You want me to cash your check11
This remark was passed after an empIoyee had observed his foreman
waiting in line to cash his pay check"and arose from the worker's
overtime and incentive making his take-home pay higher than that
of his foreman.
Nothing can be so demoralizing to the top levels in a plant
as having subordinates making more than their supervisors.

Many

companies avoid this situation by giving supervisors and other
management raises as they are given to the hourly workers.
Other companies feel that such practices make it appear as
1f the union's bargaining is pushing management wages upward •.
Many of these companies have chosen management incentives as a
way to give extra rewards to management for jobs well done.
I

The New Britain

~~chine

Company (Plan No. l7)'of New Brita1n,

Cormecticut, has a supervisory incentive covering "Supervisors and
Assistant SUpervisors of the Major Manufacturing and Assembly
Departments: 2 This plan was installed to make supervisors a part

1. Roger M. Bellows, PsychGllogy
Industry, (New York, 1949), p •. 219.
2.

McCarthy,:p. 104.
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E!. Persormel !!!. Business

~

75
of

~he

"management

team~

supert1sor turnover"

ORB

raise superv1sors earnings, reduce
make superv1sors more aware of costs.

The prev10usly mentioned Amer1can Seat1ng Plan (Plan No.3)
covers all of its "Middle

management~

defined as everyone on the

exempt payroll (salaried personnel who are not el1gible for
compulsory overtime under Federal Regulat1ons).

Company off1cers

and sen10r execut1ves, people charged w1th the adm1n1strat1on of
the plan, and salesman who work on comm1ss1on are not 1ncluded. 3
Another company wh1ch has requested that 1t rema1n anonymous
has a management 1ncentive Qover1ng hundreds of management employees to 1nclude account1ng people, 1ndustr1al eng1neer1ng people
and all foremen, superv1sors, and eng1neers who are cons1dered
management.

The top levels of every department superv1sors and

non- superv1sors who are categorized as

tlManagement~

participate

in the 1nc'ent1 ve. 4.
stock opt1ons are a method 1n wh1ch 1ncentives g1ven top
executives to encourage better efforts in their work" since as theJ
themselves become owners of the bus1ness, they stand to prof1t as
the company prof1 ts.5
The Un1ted states Stieel Corporat1on (Plan No •. 18) has an
employee stock plan for all salar1ed employees who are not eligible

3.

He1dgen" p •. 98.

4.

AnonymQus Interv1ew.

5. Michael J. Juo1us, Personnel
1955), p. 387.

Management~,(Homewood,

Ill.,
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TABLE XVIII
INCENTIVE PLANS DISCUSSED'-IN THIS CHAPTER

Plan No.

Occupation (Company)

Page Referencee

17.

Supervisory (New Br1ta1n Machine)'

18.

Salar1ed Employees (U.

19.

Management (Anonymous ) ~

75, 81, 88.

20.

Foremen (Gantt)

82, 84.

s.

74, 77, 79, 84
85, 87, 88.

Steel)

75.

i

l

....
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tor union membership.

This plan covers ottice workerBj middle

management, supervisors and other wide ranges of non-union job
classifications.
rewards for

While not an incentive plan yielding specific

specific~meritorious

deeds, it is an incentive much

in the same manner that the top executives stock options are an
incentive.

Although, a plan covering tens ot thousands of employ-

ees as this plan does, cannot be expected to have a very strong
impact on the individual.

Its major merit lies in its p.rovisions

which encourage long job tenure.

Th1s will be discussed later in

this chapter in the section covering the distribution ot incentive
earnings. 6
Yardsticks .2! Production.

In order;: to provide an orderly

incentive measurement that would give a

reasonab~e

measure of

performance and still mainta1n the, prestige of the 1nd1vidual,
incentives vastly different trom these used tor indirect jobs in
the factory had to be developed for positions of management.
The New Britain Machine Company plan (Plan No. 17) selected
a,multitude of factors to serve as the yardstick for their supervisory team.

The seven factors cons1dered are presented below,

1. Deaartmental Activity Factor is expressed in terms
of pro uet!on hours. The standard base, at which bonus
starts, is approximately 50% of normal volume. Normal
volume ot productive hours 1s 80% of one sh1ft c-apacity.
SUpervisors are not penalized for volumes under the
standard base •.

6. U•. S. steel Corporation --Employee Sav1ngs Plan. A
pampnlet explaining the employee savings plan, approvea-by the
Board of D1rectors and stockholders for 1nstallation ~~y 1, 1957.
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2. Non-produc:tive Labor Factor covers assistand fore-men, aepartment clerks, sweepers, material handlers, and
others employed wi thin the department or temp9ra,rily
borrowed from other sections. The standard number
o~ hours at any volume of activity is the sum of a fixed
minimum plus an amount that varies directly with the
volume • e. e.
3~
Si:oap Factor is based on the manufacturing cost of
depar mental scrap to and including the operation at
which an 1 tem is scrapped.

4. Reclaim Factor is based on the cost of recla1ming
or reworking salvageable damaged products for which the
department is responsible.

5. Suppl1e. and Small Tool Faator 1s based on the
value of such-rtems acquired by a direct purchase or
1nternal requisit10n 0 • • .
6. Service Faotor is based on the hours oharged to a
department from internal or external souroes for: lost
t1me (siok, 1njured, or absent); maintenanoe and repair
of maohinery, equipment faoilities, tools, dies, and
fixtures...

7.. Pam-ormanoa Factor is based on the ratio of Prod"fCtion emplqyees' aotual hours to standard hours • • •
Another company,. wh1ch has chosen to remain anonymous, has a
management incentive plan based on performance against rigidly
defined standard costs and budget.

As a second effect, the plan

includes additional rewards for management tightening its budget
standards •. Th1s tightening serves to reduce budgets, making the
continued attainment of incentive on budget performance more difficult and th1s pays handsome rewards for such tighteningse
An incentive based on the performance of the supervisor's people
is suggested by Robert Rice, the Industrial Production Ed1tor of
Factory Magazine~

Th1s yardstick may have a tendency to bring the
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superv1sor closer to the level of his workers, ~ a thought which is.
not relished by some managements:.. Other yardsticks may be "an
index of employee unrest in a department, miscellaneous records of
a quant1tative sort are somet1mes applicable ••.•. and subject1ve
judgements 1nclud1ng att1tude scales and rat1ng devices may be
used by higher management~9

The yardstick of general company

prosper1ty is the measure used in the stock opt10n plans or the
U. S. Steel

Emplo~ee

Sav1ngs Plan.,

Methods 2! measurement

~

Developing Standards.

Obviously,

the management jobs are so d1versified that you would not be able
to study them with a stopwatch.

Work sampling or other time study

methods would take away the dignity of' management.

Besides,

management at its very best, when the job 1s well under control,
may be sitt1ng with their feet propped up on a desk.

Thus,

~he

measurement of management's performance must be established thrau
accomp11shments
in the past rather than direct observat10n.
"

Some

of' the accomplishments that serve as the basis of measurement
standards will be discussed in this section.
The previously mentioned American Seating Company (Plan No.3)
I

and the New Br1tain Machine Company Plans (Plan No17)'both base
their supervisory incentives on "past records and current c'Dnditions: 10 In developing standa~s, New Britain had to study the
data and

9.

appl~

logic to determine the best way to measure each

Bellows, p. 220.

10 •. McCarthy" p. 102 •.
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factor.

Fac~or

weighting--how much of the total potential bonus

should be apportioned to each factor--was

deter~ined

the same

way, by study ot the facts~ll

cost savings played a big part in

the development of standards.

Ratio.s were established to deter--

mine which factors were important and to what degree.

The various

factors where foremen had control were analyzed on the basis of
what has been normal performance •. The degree of possible improvement was calculated and a chart established to show the amount of
cost reduction that would bring a given amount of dollars to the
foreman.

The following formula will show how this dollar reward

was established:

Assigned percentages X Normal cost

I Savings
Ratio Established

=%Reward

• %Reward

to Foremen

to Foremen

%Reward to Foremen X Ratio of Pay • # Reward to Fore.
Although this plan involves arbitrary judgements after the
normal is established, its equitabl1ity can be determined by the
fact that the dollar savings to the company is a by-product of the
performance calculation.

Such being the case, it is obvious to

the supervisors how much of a share of the savings on a given cost
item goes to them •. Management in turn dare not be unfair when
such unfatrness would be so very

11.

~.,

p •. l05.

obvious~
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The standards ,for another plan (Plan No •. 19)12 covering all
occupations~of

management were formulated arbitrarily and based

on h1storica1 performance.

Executive

~mnagement

decided that

ninety-seven per cent cost performance was "par for the

course~

and said that would be 100% incentive performance for budget
performance.

For each additional one percent of cost performance,

management received five,. per cent more incentive up to a maximum
of twenty five per cent

ince~tive

for cost performance up to 102%.

Another facet of the plan allows incentive earnings for tightening
those very standards that yield the incentive earnings.

The pro-

portion selected for this facet is 10% of a years pay to manage-ment for each one per cent of t1ghtening of the plant's budget.
The questiona one may ask here are, "What does one per cent of
budget performance mean in terms of dollars saved and how much
would five per cent of the total management payroll amount to'If these figures are two to one, respect1ve1y, the management
group would be sharing savings ,fifty-fifty with the company.
The company keeps all savings earned When budget per.formanae
is over the 102% mark.

This is where the tightening comes in. IF

102% performance can be maintained, area managers should tighten
their budget standards and cash in on the "big

ki11~,

budget improv-

ement award.. Of course, if standards;:· are tightened too much,
management loses on its budget performance incentive.

The

quest1o~

12. The source of this plan has requested that it remain
anonymous •. Also, it has chosen not to indicate those particulars
that weuld indicate how equitable the plan is.
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asked to determ1ne equ1tab111ty 1n th1s factor are, "How much 1s
one per cent of the plant budget as compared to ten per cent of
the annual management payroll tt'r Th1s latter factor has a speed-up effect 1n that once the standards have t1ghtened, they w111 be
t1ght from then on, although the reward" however handsome,. 1s only
g1ven once.
Although this plan w111 tend to level out at a constant
performanee, it will perpetually keep management on 1ts toes and
the object1ves of controlling costs will continue to be achieved.
Other management 1ncentive plans which measured the foremen
alone, are some of the older plans (Plan No. 20):
Perhaps the oldest form of compensat1ng supervisors
and foremen upon a basis ot.her than straight salary 1s that
of paJ1ng them a bonus, depending upon the incent1ve earnings of the1r subord1nates. For example, under the Gantt
Plan (one ot the early plans)" prov1sion was originally
made for paying superv1sors a bonus wh1ch increased as
the number of subord1nates who earned a bonus 1noreased.
And under some adoptions of the Halsey Plan, the supervisor shared 1n part of the t1me saved by his subordinates.
Thus the employee rece1ved 66-2/3 per cent of the time
saved, and the superv1sor, an ind1rect worker in the
department, rece1ved the remain1ng 33-1/3 peri cent. In
some 1nstallat10ns of the Bedaux Plan, the superv1sor
receives 25 per cent of the B's saved •.•. e. l~
The "objective and quantitative" measure of per£"ormance ot a
foreman's workers may eas1ly be estab11shed from pay records or
counts of pieces.
ODmpared to the

Rejects, scrap or wasted material may be (a-)

1nde~:for

last month or last year to see whether

the department was up to 1ts previous record or (b) compared to
aE set standard estab11shed by an effic1ency spec1alist
12.
13.

Juclus, p. 389.
Bellows. P. 221.

"14

e ••.••
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B!.s1aa11y,.1t may be said that the method of determ1n1ng the
standards for the management 1s a subjective and arbitrary measure.

Were management to affect the "shape or form of the

produc:t~

measures as objective as those for direct labor employees, could
be used.
Methods

2!

Determining Pertormance.

Performance is oa1culat-

ed as in all prev1ous1y ment10ned plans, by the dividing of the
standard unit of measure by the actual unit of measure or just
assigning a given number of dollars, or a perfonmance from someone else's (the direct crews) earnings.
In the previously mentioned

anon~ous

plan (Plan No. 19) for

all members of management"the budgets are based on standard cost
and they reflect var10us levels of operating

~onditions.

For

instance, 1f production is cut in half, a plant manager is still
allowed, industrial engineering may have to reduce forces 10%,
some general foremen may be "bumped" down, other pre-established
quantities of foremen may be eliminated, direct labor Will, of
course, be cut approximately in half, uti11ties will diminish by
one-third, raw material requirements will be cut in halt, etc.

If

allot these conditions are mat to the letter, management has met
its budget to the letter and the calculation of standard (budget)
p~rformance

over actual performance equals 100%.

Under the rules

this one hundred per cent would yield fitteenper cent incentive.
On the other factor of this plan, savings on budget tightenings are
ivided by the appropriate plant budget figure to reveal the per
cent ot effect.

This f1gure when multiplied by ten would reveal
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the per cent of effect.

This figure when multiplied by ten would

reveal the performance to be pa1d on th1s factor. 1 5
The New Britain Machine Company plan (Plan No •. 17) is app11ed
as follows:
The rates of rewards :and penalt1es for each factor
were summar1zed, by departments, on "Normals and Formulas"
forms--one for each department •.••.
At the end of each 4-week per10d the Accountin~
Department prepares a "Supervisors Incent1ve Report, • • • It is calculated by apply1ng the rates on the normals and
formulas sheets to current actual performance and cost
data for each department.
Oontrol effect1veness is found by dividing the actual
quant1t1es by normal--l00% is normal performance; under
100% is better than normal, and more than 100% is sub--·
standard.
Pluses and minuses are added. The d1fferenrg is the
net percentage benus--percentage of base salary.
Tables XIX and XX show how the perfonmance is actually
calculated.

An incentive based on "a combined index of the efficiency of
who are under the foremarf!l.7 would give the foreman the same overall performance as his workers.

Of course, the Gantt version

(Plan No. 20) previously mentioned increases earnings as the number of workers under the foreman increases.
has merit in that a supervtsor will
he superv1ses more people.

Anonymous interview'•.

1~·· ~lCr;';~Y'n P·2J-g5.

exerc~se(more

supel'8'ision when

Oonsideration'must, of course, be

given to the nature of the work.

15.

The Gantt arrangement

A company turning out the exact

TABLE XIX
NORMALS AND FORMULAS FORM

-

Rewards and Pena1t1es
~£!~

Reward.

~.2!~

55%
60%
64%
69%
73%
78%
82%

0%
1
2
3
4
5
6

87%
91%
96%
100%
1 05%
110%
116%

RewaI'd
7~

8
9
10
11
12
13

%ot !2!!!
1 23%
130%
139%
149%
161%
177%
218%

Rewam
14%
15
16
17
1~8

19
20

Factor

Normal

Rewards and Penalties

Non-Prod
Hours

5075 times the direct
ours tor the per10d
plus 100 hours.

D1v1de the actual non-produc.t1ve
hours by the normal non-produc-t1ve hours and for each4~ below
or above 100% add or deauct 1%
of salary •

Non-Prod
Hours

• 0049 times the direct
nours tor the period.

D1v1de the actual scrap cost
tor the period by the normal
scrap cost, and tor each ~
below or above 100% add or
deduct 1% of bonus •

Recla1m

• 0027 times the average D1v1de the actual rec:ia1m cost,
direct hours tor the
tor the per10d by the normal,
period.
and for each 70% below or above
100% add or deduct 1% of bonus.

Supp11es

!~5

-

times the average
rect hours tor the
last 3 periods, plus

D1v1de the average cost of supp11es tor the last three per10ds
by the normal, and tor each 6~
below or above 100% add or deduct
1% ot bonus.

fi015 t1mes the d1rect
ours tor the per10d
p~us 26 hours.

D1v1de the actual serv1ce hours
tor the per10d by the normal, and
for eaoh 82% below or above 100%
add or de uet 1% of bonus.

130.

Serv1ce
Hours

-
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rABLE XIX (Continued)
NORMALS AND FORMULAS FORM

Factor

Normal

Rewards and Penalties

Pert'ormanes
Ratio

100%

The per cent or reward or
penalty is determined by direct
reading on the following table:

Perf orPert'ormance
mance
Reward
Reward Ratio
RatiO
90%
80
75
70

65%
60
55

1%
2
3
4

PerforPerformance
mance
Ratio
Penalty Ratio
Penaltl
110%
120
125
130

5%
6
7

1%
2
3
4

135%
140
150

5%
6
7

same produot, , year after year, having high 1ndividual worker
specia11zat1on requires less supervis10n per foreman, than a
company hav1ng a job shop operation where worker's chores change
almost da11y.
Per10ds

2!

Calculation

2!

Incent1ve Earnings.

By and large

the more desireable, several-factor management 1ncentives are
calculated over a longer period of time than are plans for other
groups discussed.

It is obvious that management must look at the

good and the bad, the "big

picture~

Nearly every industry has

fluctuations during the year due to seasonal buying and selling
trends.

Although these changes seldom effeat the lower echelon

workers, except through unemployment which then ceases to be a,
manufacturing problem, they do cause fluctuat10n in the profits
from period to period.

~~nagement

should be rewarded for its

TABLE'XX

SUPERVISOR'S INOENTIVE REPORT

SuperVl1.sor

John Doe

Bemod

Activit;£

Normal

Actual

1. Produc.tive hrs.

12,000

15,960.0 133.0%,

1,190
2. Non-product1ve hrs.

~

June

t.15.~0%

1,215.0 102.1

.60%,

3 .. ~6crap

#78

#63

80.8

.38%,

4. Recla1ms

$43

$21

48.8

.13%,

5 .. SUpp11es
(3 Month
Average) ,

#918

6. Serv1ce
(3 Month
Average)

237

121.3

51.3

4.06%

100%,

75.5

75.5%

2.90%,

7. Performance
Ratio

11,091.06 119.0

Total
Net percentage
Dollars

-

3.17%

23.37%
19.60%'

3.17%,

$98 •.

'ettonts to adjust expenses When such adJustmtftlts are called for.
To only economize in good t1mes could be a disastrous mistake.
The previously mentioned New Brita1n plan (Plan No. 17) calc~ates

performance on a monthly bas1s.

With the type of 1tems

considered and the weight1ng of the 1tems, th1s 1s an

acee~tabie-

period of time.

But for the aforementioned anonymous incentive

plan for management, the w1de range of total budget

consideratiDn~

including less controllablLe items warrant a longer:.oalculation
period.
basis.

In this plan the calculation is made over a three month
However, a six-month moving average is used in the perfor--

mance calculation.

Thus a bad month, or a good one will carry its

impact for two incentive periods.

The aforementioned American

Seating Plan (Plan No.3) used for management, as well as for
clerical workers, pays quarterly, although a cumulative yearly
average is developed for the final payment.

The

~arterly

pay-

ments are only prepayments for the expected attainable earnings.
Control 2! Earn1nss.

In the anonymous management ino:enti ve,

plan (Plan No. 19), just mentioned, performance for higher than
102% does not receive any additional incentive pay.

This control

prevents looseness from being perpetuated, and management would
request a budget tightening to achieve closer to standard 100% bud'
get performance.

But if management requests too much of a tight-

ening in order to obtain the big reward of 10% of a years pay for
each 1% tightening, they will suffer in future achievement of the
budget performance earnings.

This plan has virtually unlimited

ceilings in that improvements may always be made.

The New Britain

plan (Plan No. 17) also bas no limit to earnings, while the
American Seating plan (Plan No.3) has limits of an equitable
fifteen, twenty-five or thirty-f'i ve per cent based on tithe effect
a man in a given job may have on costs:
Generally, top management would consider its management groups
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honorable enough to achieve its earnings honestly for whatever the:
motive for doing a job, desire to get ahead or for the extra money:
the reward is nonetheless earned.
Distribution

2!

Incentive Earnings.

The New Britain plan

(Plan No. 17) for supervisors is the close4t to paying the individual supervisor for his special efforts.

If heh the one who

has done a spectacular job, he's the one who should get the rewa
The anonymous plan discussed pays the entlre management forc:e its
bonus at the same percentage.

Being based on budgets and not

personalized performance factors, it recognizes that some budgets
were tight and some loose when the plan was installed.

It is

intereating to note that no one seems to condemn those individuals
whose departments have poor performance.

Likewise, no one praises

those individuals whose performance is high.

Management knows

that the budgets were not all perfeot when the plan was set up.
In fact, if someone does do something outstanding to raise the
total incentive performance, he is almost looked on as being a
little foolish by his associates.

This represents a grave differ-

ence of philosophies between management and factory workers in the
discussion of individual or group incentives mentioned in Chapter
III.

Part of management's attitude in judging its associates in

this company may stem from an otherwise insignificant expression
in the incentive procedure manual, that "at the outset" the incent
ive would pay the same performance to all members of management.
Perhaps, top management will put the incentive on a departmental
or individual basis when budget variations level out in time.

JQ

CHAPTER V

THE EFFECTS OF

AUTOI~TION

ON INDIRECT LABOR

The effects of automation are a much discussed subject in
recent years.

Its effect on the indirect work force is just the

opposite for office workers as it is for the indirect faotory
workers.

In the factory it is normally the direct workers, those

who affect the quality or form of the product, who are effected.
The processes of bringing material. in, maintenance, unloading
machines, packing and shipping may not only continue to exist, but
may increase manyfold due to the greater quantities of products
that are being made.

In a fully automatic plant, maintenance may

be thee largest crew of them all.
Even with fully electronic automation, where men moving parts
trom station to station are elim1nated,1 trthe only loading and
unloading required is at the beginn1ng and end of the production
line embodied in the transfer

ma.D.hine~2

The men who load at the

beginning and unload at the end 40 not make the produot and are,
therefor, indirect labor.

Since "this stage of automation involve

a higher degree of electronic control, and still fewer men",

1.
.Q!!! !l!!.

the

Carl Dreher, Automation: What It Is, How It Works,,11ho
(New York, 1957),. p. log:-- - -

11,

2. Automatic materials-handling machines are sometimes calle
"transfer mach1nes~
3.

Dreher, p.

19.
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ratio of indirect to direct has increased considerably.

In fact

in this fully automatic type of automation, such as exists in
Detroit 1n automobile engine plants, there may be no d1rect labor.
The man who operates the controls to make the product . is making
the product indirectly •. This is of course, a fine point allow-·ins personal interpretat10ns to ascerta1n if such automatic equ1pment operators are direct or indirect labor.
In the off1ce, automa.t1on has the effect of lessening the amount of indirect labor that 1s required.

Ted10us production con-

trol inventory record. keeping, can be performed on machines in a:fract10n of the t1me that is used by human beings.
roll keeping, performance

calcula~ing

Billing, pay-

and machine 10ad1ng can all

be done automatically, resulting in wide-spread reductions in 1ndirect labor.

Electronic marvels now under development will even

take d1ctat10n and reproduce it in letter form at a cons1derably
faster rate.

nIt seems now almost certa1n that the secretary will

not be seen in the office management of tomorrow: 4
Reductions of clerical workers are evidenced by such statistics as, nin an insurance company studied by the Department of
Labor, arlarge scale computer replaced 133 persons •.•• tl~

"An

IBM-702 installed by the Bank of Amer1ca performs work equivalent

4.

p. 181.

Rolf Strehl, !h! Robots !!! Among

Y!,

(New York, 1955),

5. Geoz.-g1ana M•. Smith. Office Automation and White Collar
Employment, (Rutgers, 1959) p. 12"citing Van AUken, in u. S.
Government Pamphlet, p. 11.

to 130 clerks • •

.. "6,

thlrty-elght of these workers were re-

tralned to operate the machlne.

"Erma, the same banks speclal

purpose oomputer,.replaoes 86 olerks:7
How about the nature of work that ls performed?

"Aut omat 1 on

promlses the ellmlnatlon of routlne, repetltlve jobs (In the factory).

It makes posslble the oreatlon of greatly lmproved worklng

oond1t1ons and the reduotlon 1n the length of the work weeks~8
How do all of these facts effeot lncentlves for lnd1rect
labor?

In the oler1cal area we see posslbly more repet1 tl ve

fort$ than ex1sted prevlously.
vantageOus.

ef,.~:

Incentlve-wlse, this ls most ad-

Incentlves can be establlshed on the un1t of produc-

t10n that ls constantly" be1ng repeated as was the sltuat1on- ln
a few of the P1tney Bowes jobs ment10ned earller.

The seoretary

who has the least repet1t1ve job of all, and thereby the most
d1fflcult to measure, may oease to exlst and thereby reduce the
number of unmeasured oocupatlons.

Any of the plece-work type of

1ncent1ves may be app11ed 1n suoh an automat1on offlce sltuatlon.
In the factory where mater1al hand11ng 1s ooncerned, performance may be judged on the basls of equlpment performanoes, where
1f a maohlne has a oapaolty of a g1ven flgure, performanoe may be
g1ven 1n relatlonsh1p to attainment of that flgure.

Thus the

6. Ibld., oltlng statement of A. Zip'l, Bank ot America,
"Automatlon-and Reoent Trends: p. 82.

7. Ibid., citlng H. B. Douglas speeoh to Inst1tute on Eleo-tronlcs 1n-Minagement, ~~y, 1956.
8~_~Labor Looks at Automatlon: AFL-GIO Publleation No.2l
('Ma,v l~..,o). P •. 21 ..

relationship of output governed by 1nput st1ll has the human
factor 1nvolved.
Materials hand11ng, however, is probably the limiting
factor in most cases. Despite oonsidemble technological
development, there still is the problem of economio"ally
moving materials around the plant, without human intervention or assistanoe. 9
Maintenance is one of the major areas of indirect labor in
the automated faotory •. Contrary to the belief of some, incentives:
oan easily be applied to maintenance crews in the automated faotory.

In any incentive installation, the faotor of whether the

end result justifies the expense must be considered.
Where automation has baen employed, it has been done
of a tremendous output of a repetitive

ite~,

beoaus~

thus the equipment

and maintenance crew will continue to endure in suff1c1ent quantities to justify the expend1tures"1nvolved in establishing a
ma1ntenance inoentive.
Several of the previously mentioned plans may be app11ed to
cover automated equ1pment maintenance.
In the development of automated equ1pment, wear points are
recognized.

Spare parts for these areas are always maintained

for eitherper1od1c replaoement or emergency repairs as needed.
One large steel company maintains incentive standards on a task
list basis similar to that used in the previously mentioned U. S.
Navy plan.

Such items as changing the var10us rolls in rolling

9.. IfAutomation--Threat or
p.l.

Promise~

~

Reporter,. (May 1956)

mills, re11n1ng hot metal equipment, changing roll table rollers,
and furnace grate bars are measured on a per job bas1s.

Methods

for standards descr1be the number of men required, and the steps
of the maintenance process wh1ch must be: gone through to effect an
orderly convers10n of old parts to new.

Bench work jobs, as used

1n the Navy incentive would apply to a fully automatic plant
complete w1th transfer equipment.

Certain types of malntenance,

though not 1ncluded in the standards, are s1milar to other Jobs
for which there are standards.
The Bay States Abras1ve Produots Company plan"which str1kes
averages of maintenance work times, may be adopted"by determin1ng
what sort of ma1ntenance jobs are done and observ1ng the time
required for such jobs.

This type of 1nc,ent1ve plan would contin-

ue to be effect1ve after equipment ages and requires more repairs.
Although management may be unable to mainta1n a standard cost
f1gure in the beg1nn1ng for the maintenance crew, 1t would know
that so long as the maintenance crew 1s at 100% performance or
better excessive maintenance hours are not being used.

Doubtless-

ly, a trend of requirements for increas1ng ma1ntenance hours could
be recognized.

This would allow for budget1ng on the forecasted

level of maintenance hours.

Indeed, management could determine

from this record the point at which existing eqUipment should be
replaced as requir1ng too many repairs for economical operation. lO

10. Delay records would complete this p1cture to reveal minimum economical operating acceptab1lity of equipment.
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Thus 1t is seen that automat1on serves to cause stab111ty or
use of more des1reable incentive yardsticks than existed for the
occupations in the non-automated occupat1ons.

Generally, the

occupat10ns in which more repetit1ve work 1s performed, a lower
job class1fication 1s found and there would be less resistance to
the loss of d1gnity when work is performed under an incent1ve
system.

9'6

CHAPTER VI
S~~Y

AND CONCLUSIONS

It has been evidenced that many labor groups which are not
normally considered as measurable for incentives are in reality
very measurable.

The illustrations portrayed in this study show

how some companies handled the 1nstallation, development and administration of their incent1ves for 1nd1rect labor.

Although

each incentive must be tailored to suit the individual situation,
similarities of situations may be recognized to provide a key
to tailoring other incentive applications.
Basically, the nonna! incentive rules may be followed where,_
the jobs to be measured, whether clerical or houl'ly" are repeti--tive.

Any method of study and establishing rates may be used.

However, when studying clerical groups, great care must be exer-cised to recognize the dignity or social status of the group.
Because of tradition, the Industrial Engineer cannot just walk in
and clock such groups.

He must be 1ntroduced into the group and

give a full explanation of what he intends to do.
In the chapter on clerical incentives, the author bas discussed incentives to cover nearly every type of offioe group.

In

the more repetitive types of occupations, direct types of measurements were shown.

Counts of production were entered by the indiv-

idual worker to later be calculated by the accounting group.
Another company measured its clerical group in a budget performanoe

9rt
type of plan allowing various maximum performances based on the
extent to which the individuals contributed to controlling costs.
While appearing similar to profit sharing at a quick glance, a
closer look reveals that a plant may continue to 9perate well
within its budgets when sales, and thereby profits, are sharply
reduced.
The chapter on hourly jobs in the factory covered a Wide
variety of jobs.

Incentives were mentioned either in detail or

briefly for every indirect function surrounding the direct production of a company •. Janitors, material handler, set-up men,

pac~

ing and shipping workers, and maintenance, to name a few, were
discussed in Chapter III.
measurement were used.

Both direct aDd indirect types of

Methods of

establish1llg:.s~andards

ranged

from the use of detailed predetermined standard time values

throu~

s.top watch, estimates, relationships to direct hours, and historioal data.

Incent! ves were shown that did mt differ Significantly

from piece work type incentives, in that they paid incentive on
work related to the number of. units handled.

The large scale

utility incentive with its scaled up standards to cover lowere
levels of plant activity looks very much like a gift.

Perhaps its

yield in some areas of more work from the worker is not as great
as one would like.

But a fixed station operator could still, by

closer scrutiny of his eqUipment, and additional preventive
maintenance, and even performance of a few simple maintenance
chores, contribute to better efficiency and plant operation.
Further,. by the use of incentives in this area, since most other

±
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area.s are covered, the company is able to avoid distorting ita:
job evaluation program.

If jobs we,re to be given a ra1se 1n pay

for not be1ng able to earn 1ncent1ves, 1n time they may be tw1sted
around to sound as though other workers are paid less when they
can earn 1ncent1ve.

Thus, there is no 1ncentive at all,

a work-

er would feel that he has to work at an 1ncent1ve pace just to
get what is com1ns to h1m.
Incent1ves should attempt to reward the better performance
as soon as poss1ble after the work 1s performed.

This would mean

rewards should come8at the same t1me as the pay check for the
per10d worked.

However, where performances vary w1dely due to

condit1ons of fluctuat10ns or the nature of the work that is done,
incentive payments may be levelled over an extended per10d

o~

time

The per10d should be just long enough to el1m1nate the severe
peaks~

and valleys.

The further the reward 1s from the effort,

the less effect 1t has on caus1ng better future performance.
Although, 1n the Bay States Abras1ve Products ma1ntenance plan,
be1ng based on a per job measurement, 1t 1s possible that a very
long job may be worked on w1th the greatest effort, yet the job
count would be small and earn1ngs would be low.

Th1s plan levels

performance out for several weeks by moving averages to elim1nate
that P9ss1bi11ty.c
Earnings should be distributed equally to all members of the
same crew in hourly 1ndirect crew 1ncent1ves.

Certa1n workers,

such as group leaders may do more organizing of work than actual
work itself, but they contribute nonetheless to performance.

In

fact, 1f they have planned carefully, the1r oontr1bution may be
of most s1gnif1cant importanoe.
Management must not be forgotten in the 1ncentive

p1cture~

Just the payment of high wages does not give a company its best
dollars worth in management labor.
very important.

The management incentive is

It ensures more careful training, both by

higher supervisors and by the individuals themselves to enable
better performance to be made on the management incentive; the
management incentives provide the yardstick which will measure how
good the management team is.
Other techniques which are not readily eategorized as incentives, are stock option plans.

These are more or less attempts to

appeal to the self survival instinct.

By making the employees a

stookholder, it 1s hoped that he will work harder to make his
stock more valuable.

Also, the method by whioh stock may be

given, may enoourage less employee turnover.
The Un1ted States Steel Corporat1on has a stock opt1on plan
for all non-un1on employees.

Th1s plan pays fifty cents for each

employee dollar to be vested after the third year.

Employees may

save from one to eight per cent of the1r salary depend1ng on the1r
length of service and/or the1r status.

This plan, having the

t~

year vestment clause assures longer tenure of employment.. If a
worker leaves before his third year, he does not receive any of
the company's share.

The

employee~

dollar may be invested, all or

fifty per cent in U. S. Government bonds or bond issues, and up to
fifty per cent in company stock.

The company's share will be in

100
company stock.

All stock is bought at the current market price.

Other companies give employees options to buy a certain
amount of stock at a greatly reduced rate.

Top executives are

often given stock options to make the position more invitlna as
well as making him an important shareholder to insure greater
interest in the company.
Automation has been seen to provide a greater degree of
repetitiveness in many office operations and cause an inoreasecin
the ratio of indirect to direct labor in the factory.

The la·tte:c.

1s oaused by the fact that it is the product1on phases that are
displaced by automation in the factory.

Also, more equ1Pment

me~

more ma.intenance is required.
Incentives for indirect labor will gain 1ncreasing prominance
in industry and businesses in years to oome.

Management is always

seeking to find new ways to meet the ever increas1ng threat of
competition and new products.
tha~

Modern~day.work

there is always a better way to do a job.

looking for this way.

simplifiaation says.
~~nagement

is

With the extensive coverage of direct

labor, management in now turning its Industrial Engineer's efforts
toward meaSuring the indirects.

r
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